Superrikkad võiksid Eesti arengule õla alla panna

Eestis elab umbes 40 superrikast. Riigikontrolli raportist teame samas, et viiendik Eesti elanikest elab materiaalses puuduses. Kokku need kaks omavahel ei puutu.

Kõik teavad, et rikast huvitab kasum, aga kahjuks teame ka seda, et heateod kasumit ei too. Supikööke peavad ja orbudele näputööd õpetavad endiselt alamakstud töötajad kirikutest ja heategevusorganisatsioonidest ning valitsuse sotsiaalprogrammidest. Aga oleks ju tore, kui rikkaks saaks ka head tehes ning kui sotsiaalseid probleeme lahendada oleks kasumlik.

Mõelda võiks näiteks selle peale, et viimase 50 aasta jooksul on globaalse vaesuse vähendamiseks kulutatud juba üle 2,3 triljoni dollari, kuid vaesust pole märkimisväärselt vähemaks jäänud. Põhjuseks on see, et arenguabi- või sotsiaalorganisatsioonidel puudub rahaline motivatsioon käegakatsutavaid tulemusi saavutada. Neile ei maksta tulemuste pealt.

Sotsiaalvaldkond on muidugi alarahastatud ja nii see ka jääb. Samas ei jää probleeme sugugi vähemaks, vaid üha lisandub kliimamuutuste ja globaalse keskklassi kadumise taktis. Tulemusi ei ole ning tsentraalselt planeeritud one size fits all poliitikatega jätkates ei tule ka.

Hea uudis on see, et sotsiaalse arengu rahastamises toimub revolutsioon. Üks innovaatiline finatseerimismudel viib kasumit ihalevad rikkad ja kitsikuses siplejad kokku. Sotsiaalse mõju investeeringuteks või filantrokapitalismiks nimetatud finantseerimismudeli eesmärk on luua sotsiaalset ja keskkonnaalast väärtust koos kasumi teenimisega.

Kuidas see käib? Tugeva andmeanalüüsioskusega ja pikaajalise kogemusega mittetulundusühing tahab näiteks vähendada teismeliste poiste koolist välja langemise määra või suurendada endiste vangide edukat tagasipöördumist tsiviilellu. Teades, kuidas seda teha, otsib ta selle jaoks raha. Riigile projekt meeldib, sest vangide mitmekordne ülalpidamine läheb riigile kas otseselt või siis kaudselt kalliks maksma. Raha aga riik selle elluviimiseks ei anna. Selle asemel annab riik mõne oma allameti kaudu garantii, et kui MTÜ saavutab mõne aasta pärast märgatavaid tulemusi, milles enne kindlalt kokku lepitakse, siis maksab riik MTÜle tulemuste pealt. Seni aga otsigu organisatsioon endale rahastaja ja leidku ise kõige tõhusam viis, kuidas tulemusteni jõuda, ilma et riik tööviisidesse sekkuks.

Siin tulevadki mängu Eesti rikkad: neid huvitab riigi pakutud garantiiraha ning neil on ka eraettevõtjatena kogemus kõige odavamalt ning paindlikumalt tulemusi saavutada. Enam pole juttugi kabinetivaikuses koostatud sotsiaalprogrammidest, toimub aktiivne töö inimestega. Sotsiaalprogramm, mis tõi edu Tartus, kohandatakse Kohtla-Järvel tulemuste saamiseks ümber. Jne.

Tegelikult on selles MTÜ-riik-ettevõtja kolmnurgas ka neljas osaline: erapooletu tulemuste analüüsija ehk audiitor, kes hindab, kas lepingutingimused on täidetud ja projekti sihtrühma elujärge päriselt parandatud. Just tema otsustab, kas areng on tõesti toimunud ja kas kõik on lepingut täitnud.

Kolm võitjat. Filantrokapitalism aitab ettevõtjatel eemalduda nunnudest sotsiaalselt vastutustundlikest projektidest, mis on enamasti lihtsalt odavad PR-projektid. Selle asemel tekib win-win-win: ettevõtjad saavad teenida sotsiaalse heaolu loomise pealt; MTÜd saavad teha seda, mis on neile südamelähedane; ning riik saab sotsiaalselt edukama ühiskonna.

Filantrokapitalismi mudeleid kasutades ei siple riik enam üksi sotsiaalsete ja keskkonnaalaseid probleemide lahendamisel. Ühendades sotsiaalseid muutusi taotleva filantroopia ja kasumit taotlevad investeeringud saab ühendada kapitali, loovuse ja sotsiaalse heaolu.

Mõnele võib olla vastukarva see, et maksumaksjad maksavad ettevõtjale kasumit, kui tulemused on head. Kuid üsna hõlpsasti saab audiitor järeldada, et varasemaga võrreldes on riigi raha isegi kokku hoitud. Risk on nimelt tõeline ka ettevõtjale– kui tulemusi ei saavutata, ei saa ta oma raha tagasi ega teeni ka kasumit. Siin saaks riik ettevõtjale appi tulla, et luua uus taristu näiteks sotsiaalse mõju võlakirjade või tingimusliku garantii näol, mis vähendaks riske.  Kõiki sotsiaalseid valupunkte selle mudeliga muidugi lahendada ei saa, näiteks demokraatia arendamiseks ja naiste eneseteadlikkuse suurendamiseks  filantrokapitalistlik mudel ei sobi, sest tulemusi ei saa mõõta.

Vaadates muu maailma kogemusi sotsiaalsete investeeringutega võib eeldada, et see investeerimislaad kasvab peagi nišitootest üsna märkimisväärseks jõuks, mis täiustab riigi sotsiaalprogramme. Eesti võiks sellega Ida-Euroopas esimesena algust teha.

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Article was published at Aripaev, December 2, 2013 : http://leht.aripaev.ee/images/publicationimages/6e2a2dee-3ee7-4dcc-86af-d0abc3d96d5d-Paper/issue.pdf 

Rõtovi meeleheitest ja rahvastiku kahenemisest

Kõik Äripäeva lugejad teavad, et enamus majanduskasvu mudeleid sisaldab ühe tegurina ka rahvastikku või tööjõu suurust. See on loogiline – mida rohkem on töötegijaid ja tarbijaid, seda suurem majandus. Seega peaks inimeste lahkumine Eestist ja elanikkonna vananemine majanduskasvust huvitatud inimesi muretsema panema. Peaministrit, näiteks. Opositsiooniliidrit ja ehk presidentigi. Kuid näiteks presidendi sõnavõttudest jääb mulje, et muretsemiseks pole suurt põhjust. (Lihtsalt ääremärkuse korras, et alates 1990. aastast on Eesti tööhõive ehk siis  töötavate inimeste hulk vähenenud tervelt 29 protsenti, samas kui Lääneriikides on tööhõive samal ajal suurenenud keskmiselt 23 protsenti.)

Juhul, kui muud majanduskasvu tegurid kasvaks rahvastiku kahanemise arvelt endisega võrreldes topelt, võiks ju sellise olukorraga rahul ollagi. Kuid nii tööviljakuse, tehnoloogilise progressi kui ka kapitali kogunemisega on Eestis nii nagu on. Vähemalt tööjõu produktiivsuse osas on Eesti pigem paigal seisnud kui mitte taandarenenud.

Paari nädala eest katkes Igor Rõtovil kannatus ja ta palus Äripäevas härdalt leida võimalusi, kuidas massiline väljaränne peatada. “Püstitame eesmärgi,” palus ta, ja pakkus välja võimaluse suurendada palkasid.

Huvitav on see, et kuigi Eestist lahkumine on viimasel ajal just eriti hoogustunud ja eluiga on hoiatavalt üle keskea, ei ole Eesti tegelikult kõige lootusetum juhtum. Hoopis Bulgaaria olevat maailmas kõige kiiremini vananeva rahvastikuga maa. Näiteks näeb Bulgaaria rahvastiku püramiid astal 2050 välja nagu seeneke, millel on lai kellukjas kübar ning väheldase rõngaga alt pisut ahenev jalg! 

Maailmapanka pani erakordselt kiire elanikkonna ja tööjõu vähenemine Bulgaarias uudishimutsema: kuidas mõjub see majandusele? Ning kuidas suurimaid riske elanike heaolule siiski ennetada? Arvestades, et Eesti ei saa inimestele kätt ette panna ja neid paremaid palga- ja töötingimusi muust maailmast otsimast keelata, on Bulgaariale tehtud soovitused ehk kasulikud lugeda. Mida võiks Eesti neist üle võtta? Milliseid strateegilisi reforme võiks Eesti (lisaks Rõtovi pakutud palkade tõstmise ideele) kaaluda, et mitte Bulgaariaks muutuda?

Poliitikasoovitusi on tervelt kaheksa, kuid ükski neist ei ole kuigi seksikas. Küll aga lubavad need pisut pehmemat maandumist, ning mida varem need vetsupotti arvestavad poliitikad läbi suruda, seda enam on tõenäoline, et majanduskasv ei vähene.

Esiteks soovitab Maailmapank teha investeeringuid selleks, et tõsta olemasolevate töötajate produktiivsust. Idee on selles, et järjest kahanev töötajaskond saaks toota rohkem ja kallimat kaupa. Kuigi Eestil on väga hea ettevõtluskliima (millega näiteks Bulgaaria ei saa kiidelda), on Eesti rikaste riikide hulgas ka üks madalamaima tööviljakusega riike. Kui ma sel teemal eelmisel suvel president Ilvesega twitteris vaidlesin, tõi ta mulle näiteks juuksuri, kelle tootlikus on Soomes suurem kui Eestis, kuna see teenus maksab seal rohkem. See on tõesti tõsi, aga ehk on küsimus selles, kui palju “juuksureid” ühes majanduses vaja on.

Bulgaarial soovitab Maailmapank rohkem haridusse investeerida, et uuendada vananeva elanikkonna tööoskuseid elukestva õppe kaudu ja õpetada noortele tööturul vaja minevaid oskusi. Eestil hariduskulutused eelarvest olid (vähemalt 2010. aastal) kõrgemad kui Bulgaarial ning Soomel, kuid ilmselt on küsimus, kuhu ja kellele haridusteenuseid pakutakse. Vahelduse mõtteks oleks tore, kui sõna haridus ei tooks silma ette eliitkoolide vormirõivastatud kasvandikud, vaid näiteks ka üle 50se mammi Ida-Virumaalt või taadi Võrumaalt, kes on tööturult kaua eemal olnud.

Kolmandaks tulekski teadlikult leida mooduseid, kuidas pakkuda töövõimalusi kõikidele ea- ja rahvusgruppidele. Tööhõivet tuleks suurendada näiteks muukeelsete, naiste, noorte ja eakate hulgas, pakkudes paindlikke tööaegu ja meelitada emigreeruda soovijaid kõrgemate palkadega kodumaal. Kuid see, et keskmine töötusmäär on Eestis 2000. aastast saadik olnud 10 protsenti (vaid meeletul buumiaastal 2007 oli töötus alla viie protsendi), näitab, et riik ei suhtu oma niigi vähestesse inimestesse kuigi nutikalt.

Ehk tuleks Eestilgi mõelda tööhõive-sõbralikuma maksusüsteemi peale? Lisaks talentide kojukutsumisele võiks Eestigi mõelda immigrantide meelitamise peale ja vaadelda neid eelkõige kui uute ideede ja töökohtade loojaid ning tarbijaid. Ja kuigi emigratsioon ja immigratsioon tundub olevat kaotus nii siht- kui lähteriigile, on immigratsioon siiski mitmete analüütikute meelest odavaim arengutsenaarium.

Edasi soovitab Maailmapank tõsta pensione, et vältida vaesuse edasist levikut pensionäride hulgas. Praegu on ka Eesti pika-ajaline hooldusravi alarahastatud, ja kõigile, kes lugesid Andrei Hvostovi valuskarmi Annleena lugu, tehti puust ja punaseks selgeks, kuidas hooldusravi alarahastatus bumerangina Eesti elu teisigi sfääre mõjutab. Ilmselt ei vaidle ka peaminister Ansip vastu sellele, et praegune situatsioon teeb mõttetuks investeeringud näiteks emapalka.

Viimaste Maailmapanga soovituste hulgas vetsupoti põhjas asuvale Bulgaariale on nõuanne tõhustada tervishoiusüsteemi, et inimeste tervis säiliks hilise elueani. Eesti on sel alal tõhusalt arenenud, kuid näiteks Jaapani olukorrani, kus keskmine eluiga on Eesti omast pea seitse aastat pikem, on veel pikk tee. Seitsmendaks soovitatakse inimestel veelgi rohkem raha tuleviku jaoks kõrvale panema.

Kuidas soovitusi rahastada? Kuigi laenust rääkimine viib peaminister Ansipil kõige kindlamalt harja punaseks, saab vältimatuid sotsiaalkulutusi haridusele, tervisele ja muudele teenustele siiski rahastada laenurahaga. Ja vähemalt Eesti puhul selleks ruumi küllaga, olles üks madalaima laenukoormusega riik Eestis.

Avaldatud lyhendatud kujul 26. septembril 2013 Äripäevas: http://leht.aripaev.ee/images/publicationimages/84b34991-fda8-490d-b02b-eb7867cb5a0d-Paper/issue.pdf  

Canada: Leader, supporter, or slacker in aid effectiveness?

This article was published in Embassy Magazine, July 24, 2013: http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/07/23/canada-leader-supporter--or-slacker-in-aid-effectiveness/44249

Canada: Leader, supporter, or slacker in aid effectiveness?

While it’s not doling out the most money, Canada measures up to its peers.

Over the past couple years, a number of media headlines have implied that Canada’s aid effectiveness record is poor and that “CIDA is breaking Canada’s promise to the world,” while others suggest that “new aid policies are eroding Canada’s image.” Some development experts have similarly claimed that the “effectiveness of Canadian aid has been eroded” and our “visibility and influence in foreign policy and aid spheres has ebbed considerably” as a result.

Unfortunately, quite often these media articles lack references to relevant data. Therefore, the arguments often seem to be more of a reflection of domestic politics rather than based on empirical evidence.

As an aspiring international development professional keen on evidence-based policy-making (vs. policy-based evidence making) I undertook a research project at the University of Ottawa to contribute with data and analysis to these debates.

Thankfully we have the benefit of an aid effectiveness definition provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with more than 100 signatories, brought forward a global consensus and continues to serve as a global norm for aid delivery. The OECD also provides baseline principles and indicators for aid effectiveness as well as a range of surveys of donor compliance to enable comparative analysis.

One of the main reasons for the OECD to adopt a new global norm on aid delivery in 2005 was a widely agreed understanding that donors were then doing a poor job in lifting people out of poverty. It is important to note that the biggest conceptual change the Paris Declaration brought about was an attempt to make aid more altruistic, transparent, and free from politics.

In support of the goal of altruism, the Paris Declaration elevated partner governments to the fore, leaving less room for rich-country donors to dictate their policy recommendations on the recipient countries. 

The follow-up forum in Busan, South Korea in 2011 went even further by including private sector and civil society players to the development playing field. The introduction of multiple players and their development tools (foreign direct investment, trade, remittances, charity, etc.) means that the role of donors in poverty alleviation has been diminished. Simply put, donor states today are less able to claim visible leadership positions in poverty reduction. It is therefore not fair to compare the donors of today with their predecessors of some decades ago.

Canada performs largely mid-range

Turning to the numbers, a survey, conducted to measure donors’ compliance with OECD aid effectiveness principles and indicators, offers plenty of data to suggest that among 22 rich country donors, Canada performs largely mid-range. The OECD’s 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration indicates that Ireland is a top donor outperforming others in several indicators, while the United States ranks the lowest together with South Korea.

Borrowing from a European foreign policy scorecard vocabulary, we can call Ireland “the leader,” the US and Korea “the slackers,” and Canada “a supporter” of aid effectiveness. 

The survey results further suggest that Canada performs slightly above the donor average when its aid is allocated to least developed countries, and about average when assessing all recipient countries together.

Breaking down the data even further shows that Canada performs much better than the donor average in the ‘alignment’ principle. This means that Canada tailors its aid programs to the recipient country needs more so than other donors, on average.

But Canada lags slightly behind the donor average performance in the ‘harmonization’ principle, which obliges donors to co-ordinate their aid programs. Again, the data does not support the argument that Canada is breaking its promise to the world, especially if by “the world” we mean the developing countries.

While all donors have made progress towards more effective aid since 2005 and improved their overall scores (Canada included), not all met the performance targets set by the Paris Declaration. In fact, among 22 donors, only three donors did. This suggests that missing the targets is a norm rather than an exception. Compared to the donor average performance gap—again, Canada does not stand out in a negative sense. Canada’s record in aid effectiveness performance does not therefore seem so eroded.

Which donors are leaders? 

The next interesting question is what explains aid effectiveness performance? And which donors become leaders—those that are more altruistic and transparent, just as the Paris Declaration strived for? More interestingly, how do donor qualities like generosity and ideology relate to aid effectiveness outcomes?

Using OECD data, it seems that generosity explains leadership in aid effectiveness the best. The correlation between generosity and effectiveness is positive and quite strong but only up until the point where aid budgets reach 0.5 per cent of gross national income. After that point the relationship seems to invert. Ireland for example has achieved the most effective aid while its aid budget has been only slightly over the donor average level. Luxembourg, which has been often praised for its generous aid budget that dedicates around one per cent of GNI to foreign aid (almost three times more than Canada), is a slacker when it comes to its effectiveness. Canada has reached mid-level effectiveness despite its small aid budget. While it’s the strongest determinant, generosity therefore does not necessarily go hand in hand with aid effectiveness.

Surprisingly, donors with effective aid also tend to be rather conservative in their ideology. That can be partially explained by the changes in the Nordic countries, which voted more for centrist and fiscally conservative governments between 2005 and 2010. The positive correlation between ideology and aid effectiveness might also mean that the donors’ self-interested demand for more “efficient” aid might have an impact on its “effectiveness” as well.

It’s surprising that donor transparency and altruism (if measured by the amount of aid allocated to least developed countries) does not seem to explain the outcome in aid effectiveness very well. Yet, this is what the Paris Declaration attempted to achieve: more altruistic, transparent, and less political aid.

So it seems possible that donors progress towards global norms without necessarily adopting the values of these altruistic international declarations. Rather, what seems to matter is their political values: idealist demands for more aid (“double the aid!”) and their self-interests (“more bang for the buck!”).

Canada could perhaps find a balance between those factors in order to be “a leader” in aid effectiveness. 

Marje Aksli is a recent graduate of the University of Ottawa’s master’s program in globalization and international development. She has 10 years of experience working on international relations and development projects.

Conclusion for my Major Research Paper

Canada’s Compliance with Aid Effectiveness Principles 

Major Research Paper

© Marje Aksli, Ottawa, Canada 2013

Conclusion

My major research paper at the University of Ottawa on aid effectiveness was undertaken as a learning experience to exercise a more deliberate and slower mode of thought in Canadian aid effectiveness studies with an attempt to start a conversation on what institutional qualities relate to donor aid effectiveness outcomes. The paper’s main goal was to fill a quantitative knowledge gap in aid effectiveness scholarship by analysing Canada’s relative position among its peers through the use of measurements of aid effectiveness indicators.

The paper was composed of two parts: Part One sought empirical evidence to support the claim often made that Canada has low performance levels and is exhibiting a continual decline in aid effectiveness. Part Two looked at the contributing factors to aid effectiveness.

Part One was stimulated by recent media headlines that suggest Canada’s aid performance compares poorly to that of other donors.  Headlines such as “New aid policies eroding Canada's image: Partnerships with mining industry raise concerns about international development priorities”, “Does cutting foreign aid threaten Canada's reputation in the world”, and “CIDA is Breaking Canada's Promise to the World” indicate that there seem to be two major trends in Canadian aid conduct: Namely, the authors refer to a decline in aid performance over time and to Canada’s loss of international reputation as a result. These headlines also seem to suggest that when compared to other donors, Canada is performing much worse.

In addition to critical media articles, the most recent and thoroughly researched book on aid effectiveness entitled, “Struggling for Effectiveness. CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid” also concludes – in the words of its editor Stephen Brown of University of Ottawa – that “all the chapters point to the important deficiencies” and that “the portrait of CIDA that emerges is one of profound mediocrity”. Hunter McGill goes further in claiming: “the effectiveness of Canadian aid has been eroded” and “as a result, Canada’s visibility and influence in foreign policy and aid spheres has ebbed considerably”. Despite these claims, my analysis could not determine what empirical data the authors are relying on to make these claims.

The analysis of OECD DAC data provided in the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration suggests that among 22 donors, the top performing country in aid effectiveness is Ireland and the least performing country is either the U.S. or Korea, while Canada performs largely mid-range. Depending on the type of recipient countries of Canadian aid, Canada’s rankings change accordingly. For example, Canada performs slightly better when its aid is allocated to the least developed countries (32-country data set), than when the middle-income countries are included in the group (global snapshot). Overall, Canada has improved its aid effectiveness results by 34 per cent since 2005.

The first two sections of Part One compared and contrasted Canada’s relative position to other DAC donors. The central argument of the comparison results was that while there are certainly ways that Canada could improve its record, there is no need to lament about the loss of face internationally – global donor compliance with aid effectiveness principles varies quite significantly. Compared to 22 donors on average, Canada’s aid is more effective by four percentage points across the indicators measured in percentages.

Among the ten Paris Declaration indicators, Canada’s results are mixed. In two indicators (3 and 4) Canada has actually backslid during the five-year period, over 20 per cent in each case. Further, the data suggest that compared to other donors on average, Canada performs relatively better in the ‘alignment’ principle; aligning its aid policies according to the national development strategies of recipient countries. The same cannot be claimed of Canada’s performance in relation to the ‘harmonisation’ principle, which requires foreign aid donors to coordinate their aid programs with each other.

Specifically, Canada’s ‘alignment’ indicators show higher results by 13 percentage points than that of donors on average and in the ‘harmonisation’ indicators Canada’s average score lags behind by three percentage points compared to the donors’ average. 

While Canada made progress towards more effective aid compared to the 2005 baseline, it did not meet the targets set for the donor countries. Only three donors reached the set targets out of 22 indicating that missing the international targets is a norm rather than an exception. Canada’s gap in meeting the targets was smaller than the donor average in the 32-country data set, and slightly wider in the global snapshot (or when all the recipient countries are included). Compared to the average performance gap across the donors, Canada does not seem to stand out.

Part Two of the research paper then attempted to explain what could possibly explain the high aid effectiveness performance. It described the recent aid effectiveness campaign as a tension between donors’ institutional incrementalism and a global pressure to ensure more altruistic aid, free from politics. Rooted in institutional theory, the research viewed aid effectiveness as a struggle between donors’ business-as-usual (where their aid policies are closely linked with foreign policy interests on one hand and idealist campaigns to be more generous on the other) and globalism, which – in the form of the Paris Declaration – acted to divert donors from their path dependency and attempted to ensure altruism and transparency in aid policies.

The aim of Part Two was to estimate what would possibly explain the good aid effectiveness performance. The research used correlations between the average scores of aid effectiveness and four proxy measures for path-dependency and globalism. The aim was to see which of the measures offers the strongest correlation coefficient, and can therefore explain the outcome the best.

Based on a literature review, two proxy measures for donor institutional path-dependency were chosen, including realist (measured as ideology on the scale of ten) and idealist attitudes to aid (measured as generosity of aid budget from GNI). On the other hand, two proxies were used for globalism, as well, which was – in the aid effectiveness context – conceptualised through altruism (the amount of aid to the LDCs) and transparency measures (transparency and learning ranks by CGDev).

The main suggestion arising from this analysis is that – while countries made progress in aid effectiveness indicators – the outcomes do not seem to be related to donor altruism or transparency (as Paris Declaration was conceptualised in this paper). Instead, the variables of the institutional qualities, which offered the strongest correlation coefficients with the aid effectiveness scores were the idealist / realist tendencies, associated with donor’s path dependency or institutional incrementalism.

For example, the share of ODA/GNI (idealist approach to aid) offered the highest correlation coefficient to aid effectiveness scores across 22 donors, while being statistically significant. The second highest aid effectiveness correlation coefficient with conservative ideology (realist approach to aid) suggests that donors might progress in aid effectiveness while being ideologically rather conservative.

As explained earlier, the Canadian government, which can be considered as one of the most ideologically conservative among the DAC donors at present, is argued to be viewing aid through an efficiency lens. The Conservative Party of Canada tends to emphasise a more narrow understanding of aid effectiveness: the efficiency or the “more bang for the buck”, attempting to achieve maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense.

Considering the positive and medium-strong correlation coefficients between the conservative ideology and aid effectiveness outcomes, the narrow productivity-lens on aid effectiveness might be in use among other DAC donors, as well. But further research would be needed to shed more light to this possible attitude towards aid effectiveness across DAC donors.

The very low correlation coefficient of transparency variable seems to suggest that the Paris Declaration ‘mutual accountability’ principle or the international peer pressure, which can take place due to donors’ openness, has not been significant force enough to ensure the change. DAC donors’ aid institutions achieved only moderate change towards this global initiative while remaining largely path-dependent.

This conclusion can be supported by the fact that the overwhelming majority of donors did not meet their targets. Only three donors met their respective aid effectiveness targets, suggesting that while the progress towards more effective aid was made, it was not far-reaching enough.

Ultimately, though, further research is required about what institutional qualities correlate well (and can therefore explain) a donor’s foreign aid policy in terms of its effectiveness. Perhaps other theories and other proxy measurements, e.g. inclusion of variable about aid agencies’ subordination to foreign affairs and trade departments, offer stronger correlations (negative or positive) for being able to tell a more convincing story of donor aid effectiveness.