Müksame Eesti edukaks

Artikkel ilmus 23. jaanuari Äripäevas : http://www.aripaev.ee/blog/2014/1/23/muksame-eesti-edukaks 

Kuidas Eestit edukamaks teha? Pakun, et Eesti edu suurendamisel võiks proovida müksamist (nudging). Paljud riigipead kasutavad seda suurepärast tehnikat. Suurbritannia peaministri David Cameroni müksamisministeerium (nagu  New York Times on tema meeskonda naljatamisi nimetanud) tegeleb näiteks nii tööpuuduse leevendamise kui maksude laekumise parandamisega. USA president Barack Obama kasutab müksamiskiirsalka, et mõjutada inimesi enam hoiustama või maju soojustama.

Müksamine on käitumispsühholoogia ja poliitökonoomia võte, mis proovib positiivseid tulemusi saavutada käitumise kaudse mõjutamisega, mitte keelamise ja käskimise kaudu. Kõige lihtsam müksamisnäide on tervisliku koolitoidu alalt. Edu ei saavutata mitte rämpstoidu keelamisega, vaid laste silmade kõrgusele asetatud apetiitsete puu- ja juurviljakaussidega. Sellised käitumispsühholoogiale ülesehitatud müksud suurendavad tervislikku toitumist, mis ongi eesmärk. Müksamine on edukas, sest otsusetegija dilemmade (isuäratav rämpstoit või tervislik juurvili, tarbimine täna või hoiustamine tulevikuks, homsed suured küttearved või pööningu koristamine ja soojustamine täna) peale on ette mõeldud ja positiivsed valikuvariandid käeulatusse pandud.

Kohe tekib küsimus, kuidas kasutada müksamist Eesti edukamaks muutmiseks ja kuidas edukust üldse mõõta. Kuigi meil on põhjust majanduse ja ka inimarengunäitajate edenemise pärast uhked olla, on rikkus rahva edukuse arendamisel ainult siis head tööriist, kui tekitab töökohti, suurendab keskklassi ja loob ehituskivid heaoluühiskonnaks, kus kõik inimesed saavad oma andeid realiseerida.

Taiwani näide. Loomulikult ei loo üks müks kõiki eduka heaoluühiskonna tekke eeldusi. Kuid väikesi mükse tööstuspoliitikas võiks valitsus siiski proovida. Londoni majanduskooli professor Robert Wade on märkinud, et peale Lääneriikide on maailmas vaid seitse riiki, mis on viimase 200 aasta jooksul kõrge arengutaseme saavutanud. Lühidalt - edukaks saada on erakordselt keeruline. Miks ei võiks Eesti, mis on neoliberaalsete poliitikate omandamises juba maailma esirinnas, vahelduseks proovida mõnd Aasia-riikide tehnikat majanduskasvu ja sotsiaalse edukuse loomiseks?

Taiwanis käis asi nii: inseriharidusega müksamismeeskonna ülesandeks oli majandussektorid omavahel ära jagada ning ettevõtetega, käsitöömeistritega, väikeettevõtjatega tihedad suhted sisse seada. Suure osa ajast pididki mehed tehastes ja töökodades veetma ja sealseid probleeme ja käitumist uurima. Pange tähele, et riigi edukamaks muutmiseks ei valitud välja mitte üht lemmiksektorit, millest poliitikud nõrkemisi uusaastakõnedes jahvatada saaks – eesmärk oli informatsiooni võimalikult laiapõhjaliselt kahes suunas liigutada. Esiteks uurida, mis täpselt hoiab ettevõtteid tagasi tootlikkust suurendamast, Lääne suurfirmadele allhanget pakkumast (alguses), ja hiljem juba ise üleilmseid turge vallutamast ja tarneahelaid loomast.

Vastutasuks jagasid müksajad omakorda teavet, kuidas saaks ettevõtted maailma konkurentsis püsida, ning pakkusid välja kiire kasumiiha taltsutamiseks lahendusi, neid sobivalt käeulatusse nihutades. Sellised avalikkusele nähtamatud müksamismeeskonnad olid ka eri sektori firmade ning kohalike ja välismaiste firmade sünergia tekitatamise taga. Niimoodi käitumispsüholoogiat tööstussektorisse üle kandes müksati mitu aastakümmet järjest, tuues kaasa nii rikkuse kui ka sotsiaalse edu.

Rikkusest ei piisa. Muideks, eelmisel aastal loodi Harvardi ülikooli Business Schooli professori Michael Porteri eestvedamisel sotsiaalse edukuse indeks. Ja kuigi see Eestit ja teisi väikeseid riike esialgu ei hõlmanud, on esialgne järeldus sotsiaalse edukuse indeksi uuringutest selline, et rikkamates riikides on sotsiaalne edukus tavaliselt suurem (teatud piirini küll ja mõningate eranditega). Seega, isegi kui indeks raha kokkuajamist otseselt ei mõöda (nagu SKT ja osaliselt ka inimarenguindeks), on korrelatsioon riigi majanduse ja sotsiaalse edukuse vahel positiivne. Ühenduslüliks nende vahel ongi töökohad. Just nii nagu Maailmapanga eelmise aasta arenguraport, mis keskendus just töökohtadele, pikalt kirjutas.

Edukuse sõnum. Rikkus on seega sotsiaalse edukuse jaoks vajalik, kuid ebapiisav tegur. Ning kui Eesti paremliberaalid on sotsiaalse edukuse Eesti majanduskliimat ja -kasvu lakkamatult kiites ära unustanud, siis Eesti vasakpoolsed, kes kannatamatult võimule soovivad tulla, unustavad, et sotsiaalselt edukaks ei saa ilma rikkust loomata. Tööstussektorite vaikne, kuid pidev müksamine töökohtade loomiseks on üks võimalus sotsiaalse edukuse suurendamiseks. ARTIKKEL ILMUB TALLINNA KAUBAMAJA, DANSKE BANKI, EMT, RAIDLA LEJINS & NORCOUSI, SAKU ÕLLETEHASE, TALLINNA VEE JA ÄRIPÄEVA ARVAMUSKONKURSI EDUKAS EESTI RAAMES

Canada: Leader, supporter, or slacker in aid effectiveness?

This article was published in Embassy Magazine, July 24, 2013: http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/07/23/canada-leader-supporter--or-slacker-in-aid-effectiveness/44249

Canada: Leader, supporter, or slacker in aid effectiveness?

While it’s not doling out the most money, Canada measures up to its peers.

Over the past couple years, a number of media headlines have implied that Canada’s aid effectiveness record is poor and that “CIDA is breaking Canada’s promise to the world,” while others suggest that “new aid policies are eroding Canada’s image.” Some development experts have similarly claimed that the “effectiveness of Canadian aid has been eroded” and our “visibility and influence in foreign policy and aid spheres has ebbed considerably” as a result.

Unfortunately, quite often these media articles lack references to relevant data. Therefore, the arguments often seem to be more of a reflection of domestic politics rather than based on empirical evidence.

As an aspiring international development professional keen on evidence-based policy-making (vs. policy-based evidence making) I undertook a research project at the University of Ottawa to contribute with data and analysis to these debates.

Thankfully we have the benefit of an aid effectiveness definition provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD’s 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with more than 100 signatories, brought forward a global consensus and continues to serve as a global norm for aid delivery. The OECD also provides baseline principles and indicators for aid effectiveness as well as a range of surveys of donor compliance to enable comparative analysis.

One of the main reasons for the OECD to adopt a new global norm on aid delivery in 2005 was a widely agreed understanding that donors were then doing a poor job in lifting people out of poverty. It is important to note that the biggest conceptual change the Paris Declaration brought about was an attempt to make aid more altruistic, transparent, and free from politics.

In support of the goal of altruism, the Paris Declaration elevated partner governments to the fore, leaving less room for rich-country donors to dictate their policy recommendations on the recipient countries. 

The follow-up forum in Busan, South Korea in 2011 went even further by including private sector and civil society players to the development playing field. The introduction of multiple players and their development tools (foreign direct investment, trade, remittances, charity, etc.) means that the role of donors in poverty alleviation has been diminished. Simply put, donor states today are less able to claim visible leadership positions in poverty reduction. It is therefore not fair to compare the donors of today with their predecessors of some decades ago.

Canada performs largely mid-range

Turning to the numbers, a survey, conducted to measure donors’ compliance with OECD aid effectiveness principles and indicators, offers plenty of data to suggest that among 22 rich country donors, Canada performs largely mid-range. The OECD’s 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration indicates that Ireland is a top donor outperforming others in several indicators, while the United States ranks the lowest together with South Korea.

Borrowing from a European foreign policy scorecard vocabulary, we can call Ireland “the leader,” the US and Korea “the slackers,” and Canada “a supporter” of aid effectiveness. 

The survey results further suggest that Canada performs slightly above the donor average when its aid is allocated to least developed countries, and about average when assessing all recipient countries together.

Breaking down the data even further shows that Canada performs much better than the donor average in the ‘alignment’ principle. This means that Canada tailors its aid programs to the recipient country needs more so than other donors, on average.

But Canada lags slightly behind the donor average performance in the ‘harmonization’ principle, which obliges donors to co-ordinate their aid programs. Again, the data does not support the argument that Canada is breaking its promise to the world, especially if by “the world” we mean the developing countries.

While all donors have made progress towards more effective aid since 2005 and improved their overall scores (Canada included), not all met the performance targets set by the Paris Declaration. In fact, among 22 donors, only three donors did. This suggests that missing the targets is a norm rather than an exception. Compared to the donor average performance gap—again, Canada does not stand out in a negative sense. Canada’s record in aid effectiveness performance does not therefore seem so eroded.

Which donors are leaders? 

The next interesting question is what explains aid effectiveness performance? And which donors become leaders—those that are more altruistic and transparent, just as the Paris Declaration strived for? More interestingly, how do donor qualities like generosity and ideology relate to aid effectiveness outcomes?

Using OECD data, it seems that generosity explains leadership in aid effectiveness the best. The correlation between generosity and effectiveness is positive and quite strong but only up until the point where aid budgets reach 0.5 per cent of gross national income. After that point the relationship seems to invert. Ireland for example has achieved the most effective aid while its aid budget has been only slightly over the donor average level. Luxembourg, which has been often praised for its generous aid budget that dedicates around one per cent of GNI to foreign aid (almost three times more than Canada), is a slacker when it comes to its effectiveness. Canada has reached mid-level effectiveness despite its small aid budget. While it’s the strongest determinant, generosity therefore does not necessarily go hand in hand with aid effectiveness.

Surprisingly, donors with effective aid also tend to be rather conservative in their ideology. That can be partially explained by the changes in the Nordic countries, which voted more for centrist and fiscally conservative governments between 2005 and 2010. The positive correlation between ideology and aid effectiveness might also mean that the donors’ self-interested demand for more “efficient” aid might have an impact on its “effectiveness” as well.

It’s surprising that donor transparency and altruism (if measured by the amount of aid allocated to least developed countries) does not seem to explain the outcome in aid effectiveness very well. Yet, this is what the Paris Declaration attempted to achieve: more altruistic, transparent, and less political aid.

So it seems possible that donors progress towards global norms without necessarily adopting the values of these altruistic international declarations. Rather, what seems to matter is their political values: idealist demands for more aid (“double the aid!”) and their self-interests (“more bang for the buck!”).

Canada could perhaps find a balance between those factors in order to be “a leader” in aid effectiveness. 

Marje Aksli is a recent graduate of the University of Ottawa’s master’s program in globalization and international development. She has 10 years of experience working on international relations and development projects.

Conclusion for my Major Research Paper

Canada’s Compliance with Aid Effectiveness Principles 

Major Research Paper

© Marje Aksli, Ottawa, Canada 2013

Conclusion

My major research paper at the University of Ottawa on aid effectiveness was undertaken as a learning experience to exercise a more deliberate and slower mode of thought in Canadian aid effectiveness studies with an attempt to start a conversation on what institutional qualities relate to donor aid effectiveness outcomes. The paper’s main goal was to fill a quantitative knowledge gap in aid effectiveness scholarship by analysing Canada’s relative position among its peers through the use of measurements of aid effectiveness indicators.

The paper was composed of two parts: Part One sought empirical evidence to support the claim often made that Canada has low performance levels and is exhibiting a continual decline in aid effectiveness. Part Two looked at the contributing factors to aid effectiveness.

Part One was stimulated by recent media headlines that suggest Canada’s aid performance compares poorly to that of other donors.  Headlines such as “New aid policies eroding Canada's image: Partnerships with mining industry raise concerns about international development priorities”, “Does cutting foreign aid threaten Canada's reputation in the world”, and “CIDA is Breaking Canada's Promise to the World” indicate that there seem to be two major trends in Canadian aid conduct: Namely, the authors refer to a decline in aid performance over time and to Canada’s loss of international reputation as a result. These headlines also seem to suggest that when compared to other donors, Canada is performing much worse.

In addition to critical media articles, the most recent and thoroughly researched book on aid effectiveness entitled, “Struggling for Effectiveness. CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid” also concludes – in the words of its editor Stephen Brown of University of Ottawa – that “all the chapters point to the important deficiencies” and that “the portrait of CIDA that emerges is one of profound mediocrity”. Hunter McGill goes further in claiming: “the effectiveness of Canadian aid has been eroded” and “as a result, Canada’s visibility and influence in foreign policy and aid spheres has ebbed considerably”. Despite these claims, my analysis could not determine what empirical data the authors are relying on to make these claims.

The analysis of OECD DAC data provided in the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration suggests that among 22 donors, the top performing country in aid effectiveness is Ireland and the least performing country is either the U.S. or Korea, while Canada performs largely mid-range. Depending on the type of recipient countries of Canadian aid, Canada’s rankings change accordingly. For example, Canada performs slightly better when its aid is allocated to the least developed countries (32-country data set), than when the middle-income countries are included in the group (global snapshot). Overall, Canada has improved its aid effectiveness results by 34 per cent since 2005.

The first two sections of Part One compared and contrasted Canada’s relative position to other DAC donors. The central argument of the comparison results was that while there are certainly ways that Canada could improve its record, there is no need to lament about the loss of face internationally – global donor compliance with aid effectiveness principles varies quite significantly. Compared to 22 donors on average, Canada’s aid is more effective by four percentage points across the indicators measured in percentages.

Among the ten Paris Declaration indicators, Canada’s results are mixed. In two indicators (3 and 4) Canada has actually backslid during the five-year period, over 20 per cent in each case. Further, the data suggest that compared to other donors on average, Canada performs relatively better in the ‘alignment’ principle; aligning its aid policies according to the national development strategies of recipient countries. The same cannot be claimed of Canada’s performance in relation to the ‘harmonisation’ principle, which requires foreign aid donors to coordinate their aid programs with each other.

Specifically, Canada’s ‘alignment’ indicators show higher results by 13 percentage points than that of donors on average and in the ‘harmonisation’ indicators Canada’s average score lags behind by three percentage points compared to the donors’ average. 

While Canada made progress towards more effective aid compared to the 2005 baseline, it did not meet the targets set for the donor countries. Only three donors reached the set targets out of 22 indicating that missing the international targets is a norm rather than an exception. Canada’s gap in meeting the targets was smaller than the donor average in the 32-country data set, and slightly wider in the global snapshot (or when all the recipient countries are included). Compared to the average performance gap across the donors, Canada does not seem to stand out.

Part Two of the research paper then attempted to explain what could possibly explain the high aid effectiveness performance. It described the recent aid effectiveness campaign as a tension between donors’ institutional incrementalism and a global pressure to ensure more altruistic aid, free from politics. Rooted in institutional theory, the research viewed aid effectiveness as a struggle between donors’ business-as-usual (where their aid policies are closely linked with foreign policy interests on one hand and idealist campaigns to be more generous on the other) and globalism, which – in the form of the Paris Declaration – acted to divert donors from their path dependency and attempted to ensure altruism and transparency in aid policies.

The aim of Part Two was to estimate what would possibly explain the good aid effectiveness performance. The research used correlations between the average scores of aid effectiveness and four proxy measures for path-dependency and globalism. The aim was to see which of the measures offers the strongest correlation coefficient, and can therefore explain the outcome the best.

Based on a literature review, two proxy measures for donor institutional path-dependency were chosen, including realist (measured as ideology on the scale of ten) and idealist attitudes to aid (measured as generosity of aid budget from GNI). On the other hand, two proxies were used for globalism, as well, which was – in the aid effectiveness context – conceptualised through altruism (the amount of aid to the LDCs) and transparency measures (transparency and learning ranks by CGDev).

The main suggestion arising from this analysis is that – while countries made progress in aid effectiveness indicators – the outcomes do not seem to be related to donor altruism or transparency (as Paris Declaration was conceptualised in this paper). Instead, the variables of the institutional qualities, which offered the strongest correlation coefficients with the aid effectiveness scores were the idealist / realist tendencies, associated with donor’s path dependency or institutional incrementalism.

For example, the share of ODA/GNI (idealist approach to aid) offered the highest correlation coefficient to aid effectiveness scores across 22 donors, while being statistically significant. The second highest aid effectiveness correlation coefficient with conservative ideology (realist approach to aid) suggests that donors might progress in aid effectiveness while being ideologically rather conservative.

As explained earlier, the Canadian government, which can be considered as one of the most ideologically conservative among the DAC donors at present, is argued to be viewing aid through an efficiency lens. The Conservative Party of Canada tends to emphasise a more narrow understanding of aid effectiveness: the efficiency or the “more bang for the buck”, attempting to achieve maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense.

Considering the positive and medium-strong correlation coefficients between the conservative ideology and aid effectiveness outcomes, the narrow productivity-lens on aid effectiveness might be in use among other DAC donors, as well. But further research would be needed to shed more light to this possible attitude towards aid effectiveness across DAC donors.

The very low correlation coefficient of transparency variable seems to suggest that the Paris Declaration ‘mutual accountability’ principle or the international peer pressure, which can take place due to donors’ openness, has not been significant force enough to ensure the change. DAC donors’ aid institutions achieved only moderate change towards this global initiative while remaining largely path-dependent.

This conclusion can be supported by the fact that the overwhelming majority of donors did not meet their targets. Only three donors met their respective aid effectiveness targets, suggesting that while the progress towards more effective aid was made, it was not far-reaching enough.

Ultimately, though, further research is required about what institutional qualities correlate well (and can therefore explain) a donor’s foreign aid policy in terms of its effectiveness. Perhaps other theories and other proxy measurements, e.g. inclusion of variable about aid agencies’ subordination to foreign affairs and trade departments, offer stronger correlations (negative or positive) for being able to tell a more convincing story of donor aid effectiveness.