Introduction
Although during the last 60 years development practice has been guided by very different development theories, in this essay I will focus on developmentalist theory. My choice is guided by an interest in the development industry and the interventions it has undertaken in other countries. Some of these interventions commenced by development agencies have been criticized and questioned by post-development theories, especially from the perspective of the aid effectiveness principles set out in the Paris Declaration: ‘Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results, and Mutual Accountability’[1].
I regard local[2] ownership to be a key condition of sustainable development, which the Paris Declaration is designed to tackle. That is why I concentrate on developmentalist theory as it seeks to ‘emphasize local agency in the sense of people's capacity to effect social change[3]’. I will let critical international political economy view guide my thoughts as well, as it holds that Western states should be more supportive of endogenous state building. According to Zoe Scott “many aspects of mainstream development activity are akin to state-building-activities[4]” and “it is possible to view state-building as a sub-set of development”. Therefore, I will use the respective literature and terms interchangeably in this essay.
I am intrigued both by the motivations of countries to pursue developmentalist initiatives and Western responses to these processes. In Rwanda'n case, it seems - I hypothesise - that relative international isolation had unintentionally lead to developmentalist path. I hypothesise that politically liberal West tends to be rather critical of developmentalist paths undertaken. I wonder what should the international community’s (if such homogenous group exists at all) approach be when met by the desire in some countries to pursue this path? Should the West take a hands-off-approach by letting countries to come up with their own solutions for development or should it keep measuring the newly developmentalist countries using its own yardsticks of modernity, industrialization, and consequently democratization including human rights?
I will analyze case of Rwanda and its development path over the last 20 years and examine what role did the (Arusha Records, consequent) genocide and the concurrent international community's inaction to it play in Rwanda’s decision to create its own path to development through deciding to reduce aid dependency. This path has indeed been a matter of choice for Rwanda as evidenced by the statements made in 2009, by President Paul Kagame who stated in Financial Times: “Africa has to find its own road to prosperity” and that “aid has rarely dealt with the underlying issues of poverty and weak societies[5]”.
From this, one can see the leader of Rwanda envisions development arising from promoting entrepreneurship, attracting investments and encouraging trade instead of being a passive recipient of aid. Although this Rwandan initiative has been followed only by Liberia[6], in the opinion of some development scholars this may be an emerging African development discourse, which calls for ‘aid exit’ or ‘catalytic aid’ (i.e. aid to end aid).
From this, one can see the leader of Rwanda envisions development arising from promoting entrepreneurship, attracting investments and encouraging trade instead of being a passive recipient of aid. Although this Rwandan initiative has been followed only by Liberia[6], in the opinion of some development scholars this may be an emerging African development discourse, which calls for ‘aid exit’ or ‘catalytic aid’ (i.e. aid to end aid).
Verena Fritz and Alina Rocha Menocal define[7] these states, which “possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed period of time” as developmental states. According to this definition, Rwanda can be considered as such, as it meets all of the conditions mentioned above: Rwanda seems to have a bold vision of its future development – stated in the document ‘RWANDA VISION 2020’; Rwanda is led by a strong (autocratic) leader – President Kagame, and it has experienced economic success during the last 10-15 years. Fritz et al. further assure that “to be judged developmental, a state does not need to be in control of everything and successful in all spheres”. This judgement seems to be valid for Rwanda as well considering its human rights and democracy record.
Aid’s inability to lead to economic growth has also been acknowledged by some economists: for example by Bill Easterly[8] and Dambisa Moyo[9] whose book Dead Aid Kagame cites in his Financial Times article to be ‘controversial’ and ‘aggressive’ yet catalytic for this debate[10]. It is therefore not surprising, that Rwanda’s decision to take ‘aid exit’ echoes the post-‘Paris Declaration’ aid discourse, which unambiguously promotes the “local ownership” principle. Rwanda wants to increasingly sit “in the driver’s seat” and use allocated aid money for aid exit in the longer run.
While Jens Narten argues that local ownership is imperative, the studies nevertheless show that it is almost impossible for a state to “own” externally driven processes. This is a line of argument both Easterly and Moyo support, pointing out several problems associated with top-down aid allocation by Western donors: like accountability issues and corruption. Narten warns that in case ‘local ownership’ … become(s) an empty slogan” it will have “devastating consequences.”[11]
How should the international community then conduct state-building aid projects if it is often not possible to fulfill the Paris Declaration requirement about country ownership? Rocha Menocal advises that “the main challenges to promote development are not financial or technical, but political”. It seems that Western donors lack the willingness to be merely “brokers and facilitators”, which she finds to be a “crucial element of what the core of support to country ownership needs to be about[12]”.
Western lessons learned from structural adjustments programs’ failure (which contributed to impoverishment of many Rwandans in early 1990ies[13]) taught us that there are no universal models in economic development. Consequently I wonder how could this knowledge of “problems being contextual – so must be solutions” be transferred to present-day Rwanda so that the Western donors would be only facilitators and brokers of development and not in the driver’s seat[14] in a country with an immensely distinctive culture than that of the West?
Rwanda – in motion
Just a few years after the genocide, Rwanda was classified among the failed states as the ‘captured state’ – a state, which is centrally controlled by an insecure elite trying to frustrate or eradicate the rival elite[15]. Today, Rwanda is no longer classified[16] as a failed or fragile state and as the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: “Rwanda has come an enormous way.”[17]
Namely, Rwanda has seen some of the most consistent economic growth[18] anywhere in the world, averaging a 7 percent annual increase in GDP since 2005. Not only is Rwanda praised by Foreign Affairs as an economic success[19]; World Bank[20] has also ranked Rwanda as the third best country in Africa to do business in. Donors have also been praising Rwanda’s efficiency in aid management[21]. Transparency International has classified[22] Rwanda as having low rates of corruption and one of the best records in East Africa specifically for lowering bribery. In 2010, Rwanda recorded impressive results in national MDG-report, especially with women’s empowerment and universal primary education[23]. In addition, Rwanda’s government visions its future development[24] as politically stable, knowledge based economy, which is able to provide pro-poor services for its soon 16-million-strong population. Rwanda economic goal according to Rwanda Vision 2020[25] is “to fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020”.
This supports the argument that state failure and success are part of motion: yesterday’s genocidal country can be a(n economic) success story today, but … it can also be another failure tomorrow.
Undeniably, several major indicators give reason to worry about Rwanda’s future developments. Rwanda’s political system, for example, is frequently ranked as not free[26]. It is noteworthy that president Paul Kagame won 93 percent of the 2010 vote in a “peaceful and orderly election”, which was preceded by assassinations, terror attacks, closure of two newspapers and the disqualification of opposition candidates”[27]. Nine out of ten Rwandans are subsistence farmers, many of them with only primary school level education. Despite its economic success, poverty rates are high in Rwanda, with nearly half the population living in extreme poverty[28] and USAID even claims that many Rwandans depend upon foreign food aid[29]. In addition to that, Rwanda has been ranked as one of the most dangerous countries regarding free speech by Reporters Without Borders[30].
All of the above-mentioned indicate large discrepancies between Rwanda’s developmentalist vision and local realities. One wonders how is it possible to build a knowledge-based-economy while the average years of schooling in Rwanda is 3,3 years[31]?
Western attitudes and developmentalist theory are in conflict
Heathershaw and Lambach argue that research in the field of state-building is carried “of persistent bias in that it approaches post-conflict countries from an outsider’s perspective. Almost inevitably... actors from these countries are analyzed according to the position they take vis-à-vis the liberal peace project, either as ‘spoilers’ or as ‘change agents’”[32]. Accordingly, Western researchers have been eager to point out flaws in recent development of Rwanda. Researchers Marie-Eve Desrosiers, and Susan Thomson for example compare[33] pre- and post-genocide leadership in Rwanda, and argue that the regimes of Juvénal Habyarimana and Paul Kagame have sought to project a remarkably similar image of 'benevolent leadership'. They, accordingly, view him as a spoiler. While they acknowledge that local, the so-called “follower-culture” is “already promoting norms of respect for authority among the rural peasantry”, authors do not elaborate on reasons why both leaders choose this management style leading the predominantly rural population of “follower culture”. Could it be that the leaders have chosen a suitable leadership style, which corresponds to the local culture and conditions?
Viewed from the developmentalist angle, which begs the “donors and their respective publics … to develop a higher tolerance for uncertainty and setbacks in the aid they provide”, as “crucially, progress is unlikely to be linear”[34], these critical scholars seem to hold on to imaginary liberal democratic and human rights yardstick, as they compare a post-conflict Central African country to the Western leadership standards.
Desrosiers et al. point out further: “both regimes have … insisted on the importance of changing Rwandan culture, attitudes or the ‘Rwandan’ mindset. …to serve their aims, especially to promote active engagement on the part of Rwandans.[35]” Again, from the viewpoint of local agency in development, stressed by developmentalist or post-development theory, ‘active engagement on the part of Rwandans’ seems highly desirable.
Therefore it would appear that the Western human-rights-related criticism and state-building research seems to be in conflict with the developmentalist theory, which calls for patience and risk-tolerance for the sake of the sustainable development in developing countries. As a result of controversial outcome of Rwandan recent development, there are two prevailing images of its president Kagame. While Rwandan economic success has given reason to categorize Kagame as an ‘agent for change’ by economic agencies and financial institutions and in CEO circles[36], then from the democratization, political liberalization point of view he is viewed as a ‘spoiler’ by international community, which Heathershaw and Lambach claim is ‘persistently biased’[37].
Lessons learned or not learned?
One seems to be clear: in early 1990s, the Western attempts to liberalize the Rwandan economy, media and the political scene by promoting political liberalization through Arusha Accords, failed. Ronald Paris even argues that indirectly, the internationally sponsored plan to reconcile the warring parties through democratization not only failed but “served as a catalyst for the genocide”[38]. Paris concludes that Western attempts to foster peace and stability in Rwanda ultimately backfired[39], and efforts for media liberalization gave voice to extremist groups to organizing and conveying inflammatory messages (instead of promoting democracy, as it was hoped to achieve).[40] The ruling elite was not willing or able to “own” the processes prescribed in Arusha Accords: “power sharing, political liberalization, establishing democratic elections and forming a coalition government”[41]. Instead, it seemed easier for the ruling Hutus to end 'the Tutsi-problem' for once and for all, killing almost 80 per cent of Tutsi population.
But why did the West fail to protect Rwandans during genocide? As Paris mentions, the “efforts to reinforce UNAMIR failed due to lack of interest from the international community”[42]. Also, a lack of interest by the U.S. to support the UNAMIR in its mission can partially explain the failure to protect the Rwandan people – the U.S. had no willingness to support another military intervention after their failure in Somalia months earlier[43].
As a result, Rwandan president uses this inaction by West who “was useless during genocide” today to dismiss the Western current demands and criticism [44] regarding its democratic and human rights record. Kagame is described to be “fiercely defensive of the moral high ground, he is not shy of playing on western guilt at having failed Rwanda in its hour of need”24. While there is guilt on Western’ side for failing to stop the killings, there seems to be no lessons learned conducted regarding pushing democratization on a nation, who is not capable or willing to “own” it[45].
Could Rwanda’s double-indemnity experience (both the genocide and the ensuing lack of Western reaction) be one reason behind the Rwandan developmentalist path? Jochen Hippler advises that a nation-building process can “get off the ground as a result of political, economic, social, cultural and other dynamics” and it “can involve extremely different dimensions and instruments, even oppression and acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’”[46]. And although he does not mention genocide as an unfortunate and accidental instrument in nation-formation, I claim, based on the similar logic of ‘tragedies acting unintentionally as catalysts for creativity’ that Rwanda’s relative isolation during the genocide and the offence taken for Western “uselessness[47], [48]” has indeed led Rwanda towards its developmentalist path.
I argue that Rwanda pursues developmentalist path knowing full well[49] that Western interventions are – as Jochen Hippler has put it – “sometimes mainly the pretexts for imperial and interest-driven policies.[50]” Since the West did not have any interests in this tiny African country to intervene and prevent the genocide from happening, therefore – president Kagame’s logic may be – the West should not criticize Rwanda, which has been able to secure turn-around from fragility in such a short period of time.
Now, considering the above mentioned, what would the contextual solution to democratisation and human rights record be in present-day Rwanda?
Should we lower - or rather change - the bar?
I will next examine what conditions are required for permanent turn-around and what opportunities Rwanda realistically has. World Bank has stated that three main features stand out in fragile countries: “a witches’ brew of ineffective government, poverty, and conflict”[51]. Out of these three components, Rwanda today seems to suffer only from poverty[52].
For land-locked countries like Rwanda, which depend on the access to infrastructure in neighbouring countries, Paul Collier[53] has advised to attract aid. Collier further conditions the turnaround of a failed state to three characteristics of the country: its level of income, its level of democratic rights, and the proportion of its population with secondary education. All three conditions are not met in Rwanda’s case, as in addition to low levels of income and education, its democratic record is not satisfactory, as mentioned above.
This leads to the question: which should come first – education and wealth or democracy? Is it possible for democracy “to be owned” in a country of low levels of education and income? Fabrice Murtin and Romain Wacziarg who study democratic transitions find[54] that “primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions”. Therefore, they claim that higher levels of education and higher income lead to democracy and not wise versa. “We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education,” they say.
Roland Paris argues similarly that in post-conflict countries institutionalism should come before liberalization. While controversially promoting long-lasting foreign troop presence and UN-led state-building activities in post-conflict zones, he also claims that “authoritarian solutions for war-shattered states should not be rejected out of hand”[55], especially “if alternative were more abhorrent, a genocide, for example”. He has compiled six recommendations for previously war-torn countries from the peace-building perspective with the common denominator: to rebuild effective state institutions before liberalizing. Among these suggestions are recommendations to wait until conditions are ready for elections, to control hate speech, and to adopt conflict-reducing economic policies. Considering Kagame has justified closing newspapers and jailing opposition leaders based on the hate speech reasoning[56], it seems that based on these recommendations offered by Paris, Rwanda is merely implementing effective peace building measures. In reality, it is hard to say how effective are the institutions built during the Kagame-presidency, as the outcome of forth-coming presidential elections in 2017 are yet to be seen.
Therefore, I recommend that Western donors support Kagame’s vision of raising living standards to the level of middle-income-countries and of creating a knowledge-based-economy, as both – higher income and education levels will ultimately lead to democratization. Forceful democratization without country ownership may backlash as witnessed in 1994.
Conclusion
I have shown that developmentalist path is often in conflict with the Western understanding of development. Also, international isolation, which Rwanda experienced during its 1994 genocide, could indeed motivate the pursuit of a developmentalist path. I have shown that considering low levels of education and wide spread poverty, democracy is unlikely to take hold and therefore should not be pushed onto a country, which is not yet ready to own it.
I argue that the international community should align itself behind the country’s development goals, according to the Paris Declaration ‘alignment’ principle, as it will – as shown in Rwanda’s case – produce results also for the deficiencies in development so far. Even if Rwanda wants to use aid catalytically in order to end aid dependence, this does not mean that West should end supporting certain sectors in Rwanda’s development. Quite the contrary: Rwanda’s huge challenges of turning predominantly peasant country into knowledge-based-economy still need Western support. The role of broker and facilitator should be taken in education and income generating sectors as they will yield to the formation of democratic society eventually.
Trust in local knowledge and encouraging local change agency seem to be imperative for Western involvement so that the solutions to local problems would indeed be developed locally as prescribed by the Paris Declaration of aid effectiveness.
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[1] (Burrall, Maxwell, & Rocha Menocal, 2006)
[2] By local I mean the state (vs. international institutions).
[3] (Pieterse, 1998), p. 345.
[4] (Scott, 2007), p. 4.
[5] (Kagame, 2009)
[6] Liberia states that its objective is to be aid-free in 10 years: CGD: President Sirleaf’s Ambition for Liberia: Aid-Free in a Decade: http://www.modernizeaid.net/2011/06/29/cgd-president-sirleafs-ambition-for-liberia-aid-free-in-a-decade/
[7] (Fritz & Rocha Menocal, 2007), p. 533
[8] (Easterly, 2003)
[9] (Moyo, 2009)
[10](Kagame, 2009)
[11](Scott, 2007), p.29.
[12] (Rocha Menocal, 2011), p. 2.
[13] (Paris, 2004), p.77
[14] Ronald Nkusi, Director of the External Finance Unit in the Finance Ministry: “We have shown donors that when we are in the driving seat – deciding how to allocate aid money ourselves – we spend donor money more effectively. Donors have responded to the results we have delivered by giving us more and more say over how we use their aid.” According to ActionAid report on aid effectiveness: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/real_aid_3.pdf.
[15] (Gros, 1996)
[16] (Harttgen & Klasen, 2010), p. 23
[17] (BBC, 2011)
[18] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp
[19] (Dagan, 2011)
[20] http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/rwanda
[21] (Zorbas, 2011)
[22] http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
[23] (UNDP, 2010)
[24] http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/ministry/key/vision2020
[25] (Republic of Rwanda, 2000?)
[26] http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/political-governance/government-responses-and-political-freedom/
[27] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm
[28] http://www.undp.org.rw/Poverty_Reduction.html
[29] http://www.usaid.gov/rw/our_work/programs/foodaid.html
[30] Rwanda ranks 169 out of 178 in the latest worldwide index, according to http://en.rsf.org/report-rwanda,38.html
[31] (UNDP, 2011), p. 129
[32] (Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008), p. 273
[33] (Desroseirs, Marie-Eve & Thomson, Susan, 2011), p. 447
[34] (Rocha Menocal, 2011), p. 2.
[35] (Desroseirs, Marie-Eve & Thomson, Susan, 2011), p. 449.
[36] (Gunther, 2007)
[37] (Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008), p. 273
[38] (p.75)
[39] (p. 76)
[40] ibid. p.78.
[41] (Paris, 2004) p. 74
[42] ibid. p. 73
[43] (Collier, 2007)
[44] (Wallis, 2011) Kagame is cited in saying: I don’t think anybody out there in the media, UN, human rights organizations, has any moral right whatsoever to level any accusations against me or against Rwanda. Because, when it came to the problems facing Rwanda, and the Congo, they were all useless.”
[45] Similarly, Ronald Paris who advocates excessive foreign presence and exogenous state-building activities after civil wars, does not offer a ‘lessons learned’ case study regarding Rwanda in his book At War’s End. The chapter Lessons Learned and Not Learned does not feature Rwandan case.
[46] (Hippler, 2005)
[47] After the genocide, the West nevertheless reflected upon its inaction and this question whether outside forces can intervene when the civilian population is suffering under massive violations of human rights and the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility to protect its own people, or should international community respect the principle of state sovereignty, was one of the biggest dilemmas in the world after the end of the Cold War. Prompted by the shameful failure of international community at Rwandan genocide case, UN accepted a principle, according to which the world's nations do have the "Responsibility to Protect" people in crisis. (Escriña Cremades, 2011)
[48] In addition to R2P document as the Kofi Annan initiated UN document became known, ‘A More Secure World’ document was also accepted. Both documents vision double duty of international community: to ensure peace building activity in combination with state building. MSW seeks to please everyone: both ‘bottom-up’ peace builders who demand that the rights of the individuals must be placed above the sovereignty of the state, and state builders who believe that juridical sovereignty can be overlooked in the case of ‘failed states’ (Heathershaw & Lambach, Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding, 2008).
[49] See for example (Wallis, 2011).
[50] (Hippler, 2008), p. 553.
[51] (Zoellick, 2008)
[52] Rwanda’s average national income per capita in 2010 was 520 US dollars (WB, 2010) and GDP per capita PPP is 1,100 US dollars (CIA, 2010).
[53] Collier has calculated that it takes a failed country approximately 59 years to get out of this status, which does not seem to be the case of Rwanda.
[54] (Murtin & Warcziarg, 2011)
[55] (Paris, 2004), p. 179
[56] Knaup, H. (2010, July 6)
