Showing posts with label growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label growth. Show all posts

Friday, June 29, 2012

Canadian recruitment practices and the lack of economic integration of newcomer

Briefing Note
Issue

Every year, Canada’s economy looses between two and three billion dollars due to underemployment of its recent immigrants. Their underemployment is a fact despite of their higher education levels compared to their Canadian born colleagues.

This Briefing Note analyses the failures of economic integration of immigrants to Canada and brings out some reasons why they face such a high level of underemployment in Ottawa, in particular. Written from the premise that integration means “to put together parts or elements and combine them into a whole”, as the Latin root of the word integratus means to make whole, this Briefing Note defines integration as a two-way-street. This means that while immigrants become more Canadian and take over Canadian values, the Canada should be willing to adopt new qualities from the newcomers in return, too.

On that reason, this Briefing Note highlights that the underemployment of new Canadians is a cause of both: the lack of immigrants’ language or soft skills … and the exclusive culture and discriminatory hiring practices of Canadian work places. This Briefing Note concentrates on Canadian recruitment methods and it views the preference of soft skills over technical skills as one of the reasons why immigrants’ skills and education is not transformed into Canadian economy.

Background

While immigrants have higher education levels, they earn significantly less than their Canadian born colleagues. Immigrants’ salary is 68 percent of the average income of Canadian-born households despite the fact that 79 percent of women and 86 percent of men possess a university degree prior to arrival – a much higher rate than Canadian born Canadians.

Not only do they earn less, the foreign trained professionals also work on the fields for which they are grossly overeducated. Several studies have shown that urban myths of taxi driving immigrant doctors, architects and engineers are true. The Globe and Mail wrote recently, that of 50,000 taxi drivers questioned in Canada, 200 were foreign-trained doctors or had PhDs, compared with just 55 of their Canadian-born counterparts. 20 percent have undergraduate university degrees or Master’s, compared with four percent of Canadian-born drivers.

The Globe and Mail writes: “In the late 1970s, immigrants earned about 85 to 90 per cent of what the Canadian-born Canadians earned. By 2006, that figure had fallen closer to 60 per cent according to a recent study from the Institute for Research on Public Policy. Although employment rates tend to catch up within five to 10 years, it's taking longer and longer for wages to match.”

This brief pays particular attention to Ottawa, the second largest destination city for immigrants in Ontario, and with the fastest-growing immigrant populations in the world. Every year, thousands of people from countries around the world move to Canada’s capital city. Yet due to its status as a federal government town with some high tech-industry, employment is newcomers’ number one concern. The federal government – the city’s top employer in the town - sets requirements for citizenship, bilingualism of French and English and security clearances. Due to this triple constraint immigrants are less competitive in this job market. In fact, this prevents them entering a large part of Ottawa job market altogether, regardless of their level of education, knowledge of other languages than English and French, and experience in the field.

The data in City of Ottawa website Ottawa Facts displays 48 percent difference in wages – well below Canadian average wage gap of 60 per cent – in income for a male with a university degree in 2005. The website declares:  “Recent immigrant earnings for a male with university degree: $30,322, whereas an average earnings for a Canadian-born male with university degree: $62,566.”

This indicates that despite attracting relatively large portion of educated immigrants, Ottawa city remains a place where newcomers’ participation in labour market is hindered and their knowledge and skills are not translated into monetary value.

Costs and benefits of immigrants

For one, there is a cost associated with the loss of skills and input to economy – up to three billion dollars as mentioned at the beginning of this Briefing Note. Secondly, there is cost for government looking after underemployed people. The federal government spends $883-million per year on services, and each province contributes its own, smaller share. As a recent Fraser Institute study argued – by consuming government services (be these settlement services or free health care), immigrants impose a burden of about $6,000 each[1]. This means that underemployed immigrants consume more in services than they pay in taxes or benefit the economy.
However, one of the benefits of immigrants’ full integration and inclusion to job market is enhanced innovation. A Conference Board of Canada study found that immigrants make up 35 per cent of university research chairs in Canada, much higher than their 20 per cent share of the population. Considering Canada ranks well below its peers - 14th out of 17 countries - in innovation rankings, Canada could turn to its underemployed immigrants for innovating ideas. The research Conference Board of Canada carried out was titled ‘Immigrants as Innovators: An Element of Canada's Strategy for Global Competitiveness’ and it described how by hiring immigrants organisations like St. Michael's Hospital and Xerox Research Centre of Canada were able to create high-performing, diverse workplaces.

If diversity is the key ingredient to innovation like the CEO of Xerox Research Centre Mr. Hadi K. Mahabadi claims in his e-presentation Translating Diversity into Business Advantage, why then the skills and education of newcomers is not translated into their full engagement to the job market, which would boost economy and innovation in particular?

The problem of immigrant underemployment indicates two sides to the issue. On one hand, it involves immigrants who are viewed to be ill suited to the Canadian job market. This view holds that they lack necessary skills and their credentials are of lower level than the Canadian equivalents. On the other hand, underemployment problem can be attributed to employers who are not hiring professionals trained abroad, either out of ignorance or reluctance.

In the past, almost exclusively the training efforts and awareness campaigns were directed towards immigrants: multiple immigrant centers or the so-called settlement programs were brought to existence to teach immigrants about Canadian job market, about Canadian soft skills and Canadian ways of interviewing. Some of the examples of skills being taught in the mission civilisatrice were, for example, how far to stand from a person when shaking hands and how loud voice should be used in the workplace (sic!).

Till 2006, there were no awareness campaigns directed towards employers, which would explain the benefits of hiring immigrants. Then, a local initiative was launched in Ottawa, titled Hire Immigrants Ottawa (HIO). The goal of the “community-based campaign that brings together employers, immigrant agencies and stakeholders” was “to identify and address barriers faced by employers in the hiring and integration of skilled immigrants into the labour force”.

The HIO’s objective is to “increase the capacity of employers in the Ottawa region to effectively integrate skilled immigrants into the local workforce”. One of the justifying arguments to target employers was indeed a necessity to shift the focus away from immigrants, who already receive Canadian culture and job search related trainings to employers. Local companies and enterprises have rarely been targeted or briefed about the possible value added by hiring immigrants in a systemic way.

As HIO states in their website, the goal of this campaign is being achieved through addressing systemic barriers in job market sectors and raising local awareness in order to promote greater understanding of the social and economic value that immigrants bring to Ottawa.

Canadian hiring practices are the obstacle

What blocks the newcomers from being hired? In the words of one immigrant entrepreneur: immigrants come to Canada with the 90 percent of technical skills and 10 percent of soft skills, because this is how Canada chooses its immigrants. On the other hand, the Canadian employers are looking for 60 percent of soft skills and 40 percent of technical skills. The recruiters value skills like positive attitude and motivation, passion, accountability and responsibility.

Respectively – people who succeed to demonstrate those skills during interviews get hired. Survey on skills and attributes reveal that recruiters’ hiring decisions indeed come down to what candidate has the greatest soft skills.

Evidence from a study made by professor Oreopoulos indeed suggested significant discrimination by name ethnicity and city of experience. In further analysis, Oreopoulos, P., and Dechief, D. asked: Why do some employers prefer to interview Matthew, but not Samir? They asked recruiters to explain why they believed name discrimination occurs in the labour market. Overwhelmingly, they responded that employers often treat a name as a signal that an applicant may lack critical language or social skills for the job. Also, pressure to avoid bad hires exacerbates these effects, as does the need to review resumes quickly, authors suggested (my emphases).

The result of their experiment showed: applicants with English-sounding names received call-backs 40 percent more often than applicants with Chinese, Indian, or Pakistani names. This made authors to recommend a policy option to mask names before making initial interview decisions. They also found that many employers’ unconditional concerns are based on real productivity worries.

From those study results, we can conclude that one of the reasons why the skills of newcomers do not find their match in the job market is Canadian hiring standards, unwilling to accept innovative and foreign ideas. These are feared to be conflicting with Canadian views. Consequently, it seems that being nice, which is considered to be an icon characteristic of Canadians, hinders both economy and innovation through excluding otherness and new ideas from the work places.

Considering this Briefing Note is written from the premise that integration only happens if two sides of the issue change in order to become a whole, Canada would be able to boost its innovation ranking, benefit its economy, and reduce the costs of looking after unemployed and underemployed immigrants, if only the Canadian recruiters changed their recruitment practices to be more inclusive. In this context, being inclusive means changing and giving up Canadian work style, the preferences for “nice” colleagues, and respectively adopting willingness to debate and adopt different work and communication styles.

As the data above showed, the preference of soft skills over technical skills has indirectly led to an outcome, which costs Canadian economy three billion dollars annually.

Policy option – change hiring practices and Canadian work culture

This brief will present one original option for policy in response that problem. In addition to endorsing masking the names of the job applicants before making interviewing decision, it recommends consciously changing Canadian work culture where a concept of functional conflict is used to enhance open discussion in the Canadian workplaces. Functional conflict is a tool to improving both the effectiveness of a group, the quality of decisions, and it will stimulate creativity and innovation in the workplaces.

Functional conflict needs to be distinguished from the dysfunctional conflict, which is not leading to innovative ideas and is often caused by a destructive conflict between clashing personalities. In the studies of organisational behaviour, functional conflict, on the other hand is seen to be constructive when low to medium level of conflict is channelled carefully towards challenging the prevailing groupthink.

The main aim of the new way of conflict management is to improve effectiveness of the group or a team. Functional conflict provides a medium through which problems can be aired and tensions released and it fosters an environment of self-evaluation and change. Functional conflict is the antidote for prevalent groupthink in teams, which are concerned by maintaining a nice and cozy work atmosphere. This type of functional conflict challenges the status quo and therefore furthers the creation of new ideas, promotes reassessment of group goals and activities, and increases the probability that the group will respond to an organisational change.

Therefore, based on the current 60-40 division of skills preference in favour of soft skills, it is fair to conclude that the main goal of Canadian recruiters does not seem to be to enhance efficiency, boost innovation or include otherness to the workplace. The Canadian value to avoid conflicts at any cost seem to exclude everyone from the job market who fails to demonstrate Canadian standards of niceness.

Xerox Research Centre of Canada has embraced workplace diversity, in order to translate diversity into advantage. Hadi Mahabadi, Vice President claims in The Conferenceboard case study Case Study: Immigration, Innovation, and Success in Canada for example that diversity is the key ingredient to innovation and productivity. All employees in the organisation have be educated about added value and diversity principals are taught in all levels of management. In addition, their experience is continually develop strategies to gain business advantage through diversity. He even claims that even those organisations, which are not technology-based, should embrace diversity, as innovation is very important in succeeding. This includes including diversity in race, gender, ethnicity, generation, physical capabilities, sexual orientation, and social and political views. The result is in total over 1450 patents, over 1000 publications, five new technologies delivered to market in a year and a recognition of being a top ten best places to work in Canada.

Even the federal government – the main employer in Ottawa, which automatically sets triple constraints to newcomers’ ability to compete for jobs, should be able to use hiring system where applicants’ names are masked, providing they have acknowledged the value added by foreign born employees. This possible change of recruitment practices would be extended to the Co-operative Education programs in universities, a channel through which the federal government seeks new employers. Additionally, the Co-op programs should have awareness campaigns for federal employers and inform them of increasingly multicultural origin of their students.

Conclusion

Based on the premise of current Briefing Note according to which successful integration of newcomers depends partially on Canada’s ability to change its traditional ways of being Canadian, this paper offered an unconventional policy option. It advised to adopt new conflict resolution culture and skills in workplaces (and in universities). The aim would be to challenge the current ways of recruitment, making sure that difference in views is valued not excluded by name- and origin-based discrimination.

Preference of soft skills in team selection (or ‘operationalized niceness’) indirectly leads, as demonstrated above in this Brief, to the underemployment of immigrants, loss in tax revenue, low productivity, low rank in comparative innovation rates and low economic growth. TD Bank economists for example estimated that if immigrants were employed at the same level as established Canadians, there would be about 370,000 extra people at work. In a country, which anticipates a labour shortage as the population ages, efficient immigration is considered one of the keys to addressing labour needs.
Instead of shying away from debate and contradictory arguments, Canadians should learn to distinguish between functional and dysfunctional conflict and embrace the former as a tool to finding solutions to complicated challenges being brought into existence by increasingly global economy and globalized workforce.

Although the likelihood of success rate ordinary Canadians embracing functional conflict-prone identity is low, nevertheless, the department of Human Resources and Skills Development could take a leading role in this issue and advise the recruiters about the added benefits. Some Canadian companies have demonstrated their success in doing so, and their experience is that for this strategy to be effective, it needs to have executive level commitment first.

Referring to empirical evidence regards to achieving success through conscious diversity policies in Canadian companies like Xerox Research Centre and St. Michael's Hospital will help to achieve a gradual change in recruitment practices. Hopefully, the increased economic growth and higher position in innovation rankings will convince not only Canadian companies but also federal government to consciously include newcomers into their workforce.

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[1] Economists Krishna Pendakur and Mohsen Javdani argue the amount is closer to $450. Each side disputes the other's methods. Source: The Globe and Mail, May 9, 2012.

Monday, May 21, 2012

Donor competition in fragile states


Briefing Note: shorter version 
Donor competition in fragile states: in search of better tools for the promotion of democracy.

Issue
The entry of new donor states like China and other BRIC-countries has led to the increased donor competition in developing countries. In fragile and conflict-prone states, competition between old and new donors has undermined Canada’s efforts to bring good governance. For example, the entry of China as a donor to Sri Lanka has completely sidelined Canada and other Western donors. This brief analyses the reasons for donor competition and outlines possible options for action.

Background
Fragile states are the overwhelming source of the world’s refugees and internally displaced peoples, as Canada has experienced with Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. Because Canada hosts the largest Sri Lankan diaspora in the world, we are the natural destination for these refugees. Processing the claims of one boatful of Tamil refugees costs Canada approximately $25 million. More over, conflicts resulting from human rights abuses in those countries can spill over to neighbouring countries, likely to demand action under ‘responsibility to protect’ clause, which again is a costly endeavour.

In belief that democracy and respect for human rights would avoid armed conflicts and wars, Western development assistance has over many decades been linked to good governance conditionalities. However, as of 2005, two OECD documents, which define the aid-related conduct of traditional donors, encourage the recipient countries to set their own development goals and policies. Both the OECD’s Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness and The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States mandate the donors to align behind the locally initiated development agenda, and not to set their own demands to the development. Canada, as a signatory has agreed to follow these norms.  Clearly, setting aid conditionalities regards to democratization is no longer feasible under the conditions of these declarations. This implies that other means should be found for promoting democracy.

The major difference between the old donors and (re-)emerging donors like China is their different attitudes towards the local governance. China does not set policy conditions to the recipient countries and that could explain China’s ‘competitive edge’ over traditional donors. Some local governments prefer doing business with the new donors, as – in the words of Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs – “they don’t go around teaching others how to behave[1]”. Therefore, doing business with the Chinese does not force the local governments in conflict-prone and fragile countries to choose between continuing their bad policies or securing an attractive infrastructure investment through aid funds. With the Chinese, they can have both.

In fragile states, good governance is not viewed as a means to be serving their ultimate goal of economic development. The countries are foremost interested in economic advancement not in democracy. Therefore, in those countries the promotion of democracy should be framed as an economic argument.

Policy options
One option would be to urge China to follow the OECD rules on aid delivery. However, as a non-member of the OECD, the Chinese definition of ‘aid’ differs from the one of traditional donors. China is a very significant source of finance for developing country governments – but only a small portion of this is actually ‘aid’ as understood by traditional donors. Unlike OECD donors, Chinese have not distinguished aid from other financial flows (like FDI, loans and trade) to developing countries and they do not report about their aid spending.[2] Therefore, the traditional donors (like Canada) and the new donors (like China) play different games in recipient countries, following completely different rules. Demanding China to give up its game is likely not going to succeed.

Secondly, there is a temptation to exit the countries where competition between the traditional and new donors has resulted in a hostile attitude on behalf of recipient governments, like Sri Lanka. The aid exit may be wise considering the current budget restrictions at home, but it may prove short-sighted considering possible expenses of likely humanitarian interventions in the future or administering claims of boatfuls of refugees.

The best option for Canada is to rephrase its good governance rhetoric and instead of framing it as the end in itself, the demands and recommendations for democratization should be portrayed as a tool to achieving economic success. Instead of ‘democratization’ and ‘good governance’, Canada should be using economic vocabulary and discontinue to tie favourable policy change to aid delivery.

On that note, Canada could use the key words like ‘inclusive political and economic institutions’ in the dialogue with recipient countries. The economists Acemoglu and Robinson[3] have claimed that inclusive institutions are the key to the lasting economic success. According to them, the countries, which set up ‘extractive institutions’, are set to fail. Extractive institutions allow only a limited number of people to access the benefits of economic success, and therefore create conditions where those excluded are likely to challenge the rule of the government, making it unlikely to survive.


Acknowledging that undemocratic countries (like China) are able to achieve significant economic growth, the authors nevertheless caution that over time it becomes difficult to maintain the momentum. They reason their argument of sustained growth with the need to innovate, and they argue that innovation can only take place in the countries with inclusive economic and political institutions. 



The work of economist and Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen offers other useful key words for successful rhetoric. His notion of ‘capabilities approach to development’ is likely to be understood better in fragile countries than the ‘democratization’. Sen views poverty as a capability-deprivation, which means that countries in low-income bracket could develop better and faster if they removed their internal obstacles for free participation in economic activities. This involves exclusion of lower caste, women, ethnic and sexual minorities from political and economic participation and decision-making.

To support those claims, Canada could refer to the empirical evidence, which proves that equal rights lead indeed to the rise in incomes and productivity. Economists Chang-Tai Hsieh, Erik Hurst, Charles Jones and Peter Klenow[4] argue that as much as 20 percent of the growth in productivity in the United States over the past 50 years can be attributed to expanded opportunities for women and blacks. Lowering ‘discriminatory barriers’ can be tremendously beneficial to the economy, they claim: greater equality results in better use of available talent, and therefore it leads to increased productivity and wealth.

Conclusion
The old models of aid conditionalities regards to achieving democratic governance in fragile countries are no longer viable. As both the Chinese and the governments of fragile countries are foremost concerned about their economic development, the change in rhetoric is needed. Instead of framing democratization as a ‘tool for greater justice’ and using it as a persuasion for access to aid funds, good governance should be portrayed as an economic argument. That type of change in rhetoric is likely to reduce the frictions between the donors, as well. Referring to the empirical evidence of improved productivity and therefore wealth could prove more productive in terms of achieving gradual policy change.

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[1] Campbell, I., Wheeler, T., Attree, L., Butler, D. M., & Mariani, B. (2012). China and conflict-affected states, Between principle and pragmatism. SAFERWORLD.
[2] For example, it is estimated that China’s aid to Africa in 2008 was approximately US$1.2 billion. In contrast, the U.S. provided US$ 7.2 billion, the EU $US 6.0 billion, the World Bank US$ 4.1 billion and France US$ 3.4 billion. Ibid.  
[3]Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2011). Why Nations Fail, The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty.
[4]Hsieh, C.-T., Hurst, E., Jones, C., & Klenow, P. (2012). The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth.



Thursday, March 15, 2012

To liberalize or not?

To liberalize or not, this is the central question in debates about the economies of developing countries. As the three Baltic countries and Estonia in particular have been considered[1],[2] as most successful former Soviet Union country out of 15 member states[3], in my paper I will explore which events had led to macroeconomic success. I will also evaluate the downsides of current macroeconomic situation, which carry a significant social cost. To a degree, my paper would be immersed in the debate whether (neo)liberal policies contribute to economic growth of developing countries.

What causes macroeconomic growth?
Estonia, a small country on the Baltic Sea shore[4] owes its macroeconomic growth to many eco-political decisions. But other, perhaps equally contributing factors are peaceful separation from Soviet Union (SU), geographical proximity to Nordic countries[5] and relative strength of institutions, together with the readiness to reform, which was further catalyzed by a desire to join European Union.

As Thorvaldur & Eduard (2009) assert, a conflict-free breakup from the SU gave Estonia an advantage over some other former SU (fSU) member states like Moldova, which enjoyed a similar economic level during the Soviet period. Lack of conflict allowed Estonia to avoid low-income trap, which both Moldova and Georgia fell into. As a result, Estonia did not suffer from high levels of corruption[6] and was able to reform its institutions. Compared to other fSU countries, its institutions were more effective in fighting shadow economy. The relatively small black market share contributed to an enlarged tax base and consequently to higher income, as Gylfason & Hochreiter suggest (Gylfason & Hochreiter, 2009).
Estonia, together with other Baltic countries benefitted from their proximity to Nordic countries, as Gylfason & Hochreiter claim: “when foreign markets collapsed in the early 1990s, Estonia was able to win new markets for its exports remarkably quickly in Western Europe” (ibid). Attractive opportunity to become an EU member country acted as a catalyzing tool for speeding up institution building and as a result, the recovery after the collapse of the Soviet Union economy was relatively fast. This was interrupted only by a “short-lived slowdown in 1999-2000 due to the Russian crisis” (Deroose, Flores, Giudice, & Turrini, 2010).

Another contributing factor to macroeconomic growth stemmed from the exclusion of the former Soviet political elite from power, as they were not unified as a political party. As a result, due to the elimination of the former elite from decision making, Adam, Kristan, & Tomšič note that “ideological standing of new Estonian political elite of early 1990ies played an important role in determining the type of capitalism pursued”. Unlike most of Eastern European countries, where former communists held on to the power, Estonia established (neo)liberal macroeconomic policies (Adam, Kristan, & Tomšič, 2009) – diametrically opposite from the Soviet centrally planned economy. Estonia established a flat income tax[7], opened up its economy, abolished tariffs for imports and kept a balanced budget or a very small deficit. The so-called Chang’s ladder – protectionist measures for promoting infant industry growth (Chang, 2003) was never used. These macroeconomic measures allowed massive foreign direct investment to flow into the country.

How to measure economic development?
There are many indices to measuring the levels of living standard. Income levels, GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI) are most widely used. Estonian average income, which started declining in 1990 (an average Estonian then earned 10,300 dollars annually in PPP dollars), by 1994 had fallen to the 1970 level – 7734 dollars! Poverty increased and the life expectancy shortened drastically during first couple years of re-independence.
The negative income trend was eventually reversed in 1994 and income consequently doubled during the next 10 years, while Estonia pursued (neo)liberal policies. As authors from European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs claim, the reform process was highly successful in reorienting the Baltic economies towards a market system, and thus helping these countries become eligible for EU accession in 2004 (Deroose, Flores, Giudice, & Turrini, 2010).

Estonia enjoyed unusually high growth in the mid-2000s – even by the standards of emerging economies (ibid.) – during which period the structure of the economy was changed. Previously a mainly agricultural country with Soviet-style heavy industry was turned into a subcontracting nation for services and IT[8], with a strong tourism sector. It was during the boom of early 2000s when Estonia was called to be one of the Baltic Tigers, distinguishing itself from other Eastern European and fSU countries[9].

In 2007, a year before the global financial meltdown, Estonians earned on average 19.705 PPP dollars[10] which is significant enhancement when compared to the early years of re-independence. By 2010, the income levels have reached parity with formerly communist Central European countries like Hungary and Poland, which used to be considerably better off. Considering the speed of catch-up in income levels, this fast progress indeed shows that liberal economic policies can, in some cases, contribute to the economic growth.

Earlier I measured the rise in living standards loosely through income rise in PPP dollars[11]. Now, I would like to amend the picture by adding HDI and other measurements to picture. Although considered to be an alternative to the money-centric measurement of well-being[12], HDI nevertheless includes economic measures in its formula. HDI does not seem to be satisfactory in portraying the price the people had paid for the economic growth. During the boom years, it was clear that the generated wealth was not distributed equally within the country, giving social scientists a reason to identify “Two Estonias” – one poor, the other better off.  For example, the most recent analysis composed by the Ombudsman of Estonia (Chancellor of Justice, 2011) shows that almost every fifth child in Estonia in 2010 lived in poverty due to inequality.
The ratio of total income[13] received by the top quintile to that received by the lowest quintile of the population is 5.0. Although this ratio does not differ from the European Union average, which is similarly 5.0 (Statistics of Estonia), the inequality has indeed risen since the 1989. Largely, in accordance with Kuznets’s reversed U, according to which economic growth first raises the inequality and later it levels out (Cypher & Dietz, 2004), the Estonian inequality graph seems similar to an inversed W.
Gapminder visualisation tool for the health and wealth of countries makes the picture of economic development even more complicated. For example, in highly unequal and somewhat poorer Mexico people enjoy better health than Estonians. Does this mean that economic success has negatively influenced people’s health, regardless of increased life expectancy? Similarly, the OECD Better Life index, which visualises the quality of life as flowers, shows the lopsidedness of Estonian flower petals, where Life Satisfaction is significantly shorter than other petals such as  Education[14]

Would neoliberal policies also alleviate economic downturns?
Similarly to my earlier speculation[15] about a likely correlation between (neo)liberal economic policies at the presence of some other favourable conditions and increased income levels, I am curious about what helps countries in deep recession?  In the case of open economy, it has been argued that the government’s ability to control the destructive globalized economy is limited (Held & McGrew, 1993). And what to think of Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz’s recent comments the media: that the austerity measures Europe is planning to introduce would be suicidal?

The truth is that an open economy has not only raised income and the quality of life, but it has consequently opened Estonia to severe global crises. An open economy has brought a very short boom and bust cycle and severe economic meltdowns, during which the GDP growth was negative (-14 per cent in 2009). The Estonian government nevertheless introduced severe austerity measures to control the situation in 2008. These processes resulted in lower salaries (approximately by nine percent) while personal debt of many people had increased[16]. Despite that shocking downturn, Estonia’s economic decline was not so sharp compared to the massive economic failure of neighbouring Latvia, which needed assistance from IMF[17]. Regardless of this comparison, Estonian unemployment rate in 2010 was nevertheless a staggering 16.8 per cent.

Two years after introducing austerity measures, The Economist magazine reported in July 2011: “Plunging unemployment, rocketing growth, soaring exports and a budget surplus: that is the story of Estonia as it bounces back from a precipitous economic collapse.” The point The Economist wanted to convey was that austerity measures and strictly balanced budget guarantee a fast recovery after a severe economic meltdown, as the competitiveness of the country increases and it is therefore again able to attract investments. The Estonia.eu website claims that in 2010, the annual GDP grew by 3.1 per cent compared to the previous year. According to the 2011 forecast of the Ministry of Finance, the economy will grow in 2011 and in 2012 by 4 per cent[18], which is likely the highest growth rate in Europe.

Conclusion
Even if in the strictly economic sense the liberal policies and shock therapies have increased the incomes and improved the health of Estonians, people are increasingly tired of the sudden boom and bust cycle. Strikes organised by Estonian teachers and nurses prove that. I agree with the OECD recommendation on its website: “… to reduce the vulnerability of the poor and help them adjust to make the most of new opportunities that are created … open markets require parallel investments in human capital (education, health and nutrition) and physical infrastructure, access to credit and technical assistance, as well as social safety nets and policies to promote stability” (OECD). Although Estonians are relatively well educated, the health and nutrition (especially those of children) and social safety nets would need additional investment.


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[1] (Gylfason & Hochreiter, 2009)
[2] (Adam, Kristan, & Tomšič, 2009)
[3] Today, 20 years after the break up of SU, Estonia is a member of EU, NATO and OECD but also entered euro-zone and is part of Schengen visa regime. These memberships make Estonia the most integrated country to European structures, among Northern European countries. Today, Estonia is more centrally located to Europe than it has ever been.
[4] Regarding the size of territory, Estonia with its 45,227 km2 can be compared to province Nova Scotia (53,338 km2) in Canada, although population wise Estonian population of 1,3 million compares better with Manitoba (1,2 M).
[5] Even during Soviet times, Western culture was nevertheless influencing Estonia. Finnish communication theorist Terhi Rantanen claims that globalization does take place in closed societies, too (Rantanen, 2001). Soviet audience found their way to non-Communist programs through individual use of videocassettes, she claims. This “outward Westernization” of Soviet Estonia was also experienced via Finnish tourists, Finnish TV and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty and Voice of America. The documentary ‘Disco and Atomic War’ (Kilmi & Aarma, 2009) claims that due to Finnish TV coverage in Estonia, “the Soviet regime went head-to-head with Western pop culture and learned that no one really cared about Lenin or Marx. Instead, the Estonian public wanted to know who shot J.R. and what the latest disco moves are”.
[6] Estonia ranks 29th on Worldwide Corruption Perceptions ranking on 2011, compared to fSU and Eastern Europe countries Estonia is the least corrupt country.
[7] In 1994, Estonia became the first country in Europe to introduce a so-called “flat tax” (The Economist, 2005)
[8] Estonian engineers created the Skype, Estonian government established e-elections, e-government and computer readable ID-card, and set up a Tiger Leap school program of computerization.
[9] Its’ so called “tiger-partners” being geographically distant: in Asia (Asian tigers) and in Ireland (Celtic tiger).
[10] All income data is taken from Gapminder unless otherwise specified.
[11] (It must be mentioned that Estonia succeeded to adopt euro ‘due to prudent fiscal policy, abundant foreign exchange reserves, and capital buffers for the banking sector’ (Deroose, Flores, Giudice, & Turrini, 2010).
[12] Similarly to the GDP and income level, HDI has gone up as well during the transitional period, placing Estonia in the highly developed countries bracket.
[13] Understood as equalized disposable income (Statistics of Estonia)
[14] http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/estonia/
[15] Some academics studying globalization and development[15] would deny that there is a possibility that neoliberal policies could, in the presence of some other favourable conditions as mentioned earlier lead to economic growth[15]. As most Western authors study failure of Structural Adjustment Programs in African countries (and rarely examine countries of former Soviet block or so called Second World) they conclude correctly that (neo)liberal policies caused increase in poverty levels. But Estonian case recommends that in presence of other favourable events, there is an exemption to the rule.
[16] On the other hand, no large scale protests a ‘la Greece took place in Estonia.
[17] Latvia had to be assisted by the European Union, the IMF and other donors (Deroose, Flores, Giudice, & Turrini, 2010)
[18] http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/economy-a-it/a-dynamic-economy.html