Canada’s feminist international assistance policy is not the most effective way to reduce poverty

In the early 2000s, a director of a Moldovan women’s nongovernmental organization (NGO) told me that she would never publicly associate herself with feminism. I found this statement quite curious as I had just asked her to submit an article on gender issues for the Moldovan family planning association’s website. My goal of promoting gender equality and reproductive health awareness with local voices was clearly a feminist one, wasn’t it? Not really, she explained. If she were to declare publicly that she’s a feminist, her colleagues and friends would stop shaking her hand, she told me. She would lose all credibility, and she needed credibility to run an NGO dealing with gender-based violence.

She then referred to an obscure instance of Western feminists publicly berating Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the Soviet Union, as a reason why feminism had lost its appeal for her. They were not respectful, she argued. This scandalous event might not even have been real, but the story was influential nonetheless. It led this local leader in women’s issues to say that not only is she not a feminist but she would be ashamed of being considered one.

Fifteen years later, Canada has adopted a feminist international assistance policy to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls as “the most effective way to reduce poverty and build a more inclusive, peaceful and prosperous world.”

Canada means well. The fact that women often bear the costs in development stands out: women and girls are more likely to be among the poor, the least educated and the ones experiencing violence. There clearly is a need to help women and girls.

Effective aid is locally owned

However, the first principle of effective foreign aid is that development needs to be locally owned. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted in 2005, clearly states that developing countries are supposed to set their own strategies for poverty reduction, and the donor countries are expected to align behind these objectives and to use local systems. It’s difficult to imagine that the countries with the gravest conditions for women will “own” feminism, a Western concept.

Evaluators assessing foreign aid programming for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability – the criteria set by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, know that the projects that are implemented with low levels of local ownership are less likely to be sustainable after the donor funding is withdrawn. Feminism has to be relevant to Canada’s development partners, and it would need to be reflected in their governments’ poverty reduction strategies. Additionally, achieving outcomes that are in serious disagreement with local traditions ends up being less efficient economically than running projects that enjoy strong local ownership. Potentially low relevance, high inefficiency, and low long-term sustainability mean that development interventions cannot be considered effective.

The second set of problems related to feminist development initiatives is associated with impact and attribution. In the near future, can Canada truly credibly claim that any success in the partner countries was due to our feminist development interventions, and not caused by other favourable trends beyond Canada’s control?

The truth is, social norms guiding the behaviour of men and women have evolved across centuries, following a local logic, and they relate to people’s innate mindset. They are “sticky”: outsiders’ efforts to change ways of life by rearranging power relationships are doomed to fail if they do not follow the local logic. Tinkering with gender relations is not viewed universally as bringing benefits to everyone. Some high-powered men might perceive Canada’s well-meaning efforts as threatening, and they are not likely to support feminist policies that come from abroad. And yet they are also stakeholders in development, interested in maintaining or increasing their prestige or status in their respective societies.

Sticky cultures

In his book The Secret of Our Success, Joseph Henrich of Harvard University writes that when politicians design new policies, they inevitably import their own assumptions about human nature, often rooted in Enlightenment philosophies. He points out that as we have seen from the sad experience of transplanting Western institutions to countries that have different incentives and standards for judging and punishing people, the new norms need to fit in with people’s social norms, informal institutions and cultural psychology.

People are selective social learners, Henrich warns, which means that they do not change their habits purely based on “the facts” or “education”; rather, they copy the behaviour of influential people in their social circles. People are more likely to learn from those whose prestige, success, sex, dialect and ethnicity they consider important, especially on issues related to food, sex, danger and norm violations. It seems as if the best way to alter gender relations is to work with influential local men, allowing them to lead by example. It’s true that Canada has increased its profile internationally, but its high prestige is probably not strong enough to contribute to change in distinctly different societies. 

Cultures are long-lasting; they have evolved over centuries and they change slowly. That is especially true when influential religious organizations work to maintain the status quo in relations between the sexes and have strong views about sexual minorities. Change in social policies depends on the entire society. Or, as Henrich puts it, change depends on the expansion of the collective brain, which in turn depends on openness to discuss issues and ideas. Instead of artificially transplanting copies of Western institutions to other countries, Henrich recommends designing a “variation and selection system” allowing alternative institutions and organizational forms to compete. Locals then decide which form wins and will be adopted.

Win-win for all?

Canada’s new feminist international assistance policy argues that the feminist approach to development “leads to better development results and benefits everyone, including men and boys.” How this claim works out in practice needs to be substantiated in the program monitoring phase and in evaluations. When men perceive that their traditional social status is threatened, a backlash may follow. Evaluators, therefore, need to be attuned to the unintended consequences.

Another risk of the explicitly feminist approach is that it may ignore cases where men, especially gay men, and boys are disadvantaged and vulnerable. Canadian feminist international development policy sees men and boys predominantly as a target group that should be lectured, educated and engaged but not as direct beneficiaries of assistance.

At yet, as Sean Stevens of New York University points out in an article on gender differences, boys seem to be hurt more than girls by living in deprived neighbourhoods. The cycle of poverty seems to be more persistent for the poorest boys than for girls. Even in Canada, as the Canadian economist Miles Corak found, boys born into the poorest families (the bottom 5 percent) were less likely to escape poverty than girls born into the same conditions.

An article by Diane Halpern, professor emerita at Claremont McKenna College and her coauthors discussing sex differences in science and mathematics adds that male development is more sensitive to environmental conditions, which can explain why there is more variability among males in their academic performance. It seems that in the most deprived conditions, it is boys who would benefit from additional help.

That is why a successful development policy would be an inclusive one that would engage men, women, boys, and girls equally depending on their needs and within the social systems where they live. A development policy designed around Paris Declaration principles, evaluative recommendations on program effectiveness and – most importantly - equal opportunities for all would be more effective than an explicitly feminist one.

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Marje Aksli is an independent evaluation consultant based in Washington, DC, focusing on international development and security programming. Her thematic interests include the impact of global governance on policy-making.

About the limitations of CSR

My interview with Mr. Ingram from NSI, published in 2012 The Rising Africa magazine

As the North-South Institute prepares for the NSI Ottawa Forum on Governance of Natural Resources for African Development, in May 2013, The Rising Africa talked to the former special representative of the World Bank to the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, and the current President of The North South Institute, the leading development think tank in Canada, Mr. Joseph K. Ingram.

 

Our editor Marje Aksli visited Mr. Ingram in his office in Ottawa, and asked what the biggest challenge in Africa’s development is.

We all know that Sub-Saharan African economies are growing at an exceptional rate, and that the narrative of Africa is changing for the better. That is important, and I am not going to repeat their successes here. Yet in spite of these positive changes the biggest challenge in Africa remains its prevailing poverty and growing inequality. Most public policy experts would say that the most important factor in reducing inequality is providing meaningful employment opportunities to a growing youth population. Africa has serious problems with unemployment, even in the fast growing economies. Much of the unemployment is attributable to a huge youth surge – 60 percent of the total population in Sub-Saharan Africa is under the age of 30. This creates very high dependency ratios. South Africa, for example, has extremely high youth unemployment even though they have a relatively skilled labour force compared to other African countries.

How do you comment on some studies which claim that the younger the population, the lower probability that the country is democratic?

That theory is inconsistent with the fact that the number of democracies in Africa has risen from 8 to 23 in the last decade. Look at what has happened with the Arab Spring! It is largely young people who have brought about democratic change.  For the moment, it may not always be change that we like, but it is the first step towards an enduring democratic system.  A young population is a source of economic growth – you can’t have growth without adding to the labour force and increasing skill level of that labour. Also, history and empirical evidence show that with increased education there is increased demand for greater transparency and accountability, basic building blocks of democratic development.

So what do we know about the youth surge in Africa?

We know that if you do not meet youth’s expectations, there are going to be political problems, and a breakdown of social cohesion producing all kinds of negative outcomes including social discontent, surge in migration patterns, contestation over scare resources, extremism and religious fundamentalism. Groups take advantage of these problems to create challenges to the state. We are starting to see manifestations of that that fundamentalism in both the Maghreb, Somalia and the Sahel: in northern Mali, and even in Nigeria where religious violence has grown.

Is Africa’s challenge of jobless growth unique in the global scene?

The issue of jobless and job-poor growth is not unique to Africa: it is a problem we share globally, though not with the same outcomes. The U.S. and Canada are also experiencing the growing inequality and high levels of under and unemployment But clearly its outcomes are more acute in Africa where socio-economic conditions are much worse to begin with. Additionally, Africa has relatively weak political institutions. That said, there are significant improvements in the overall quality of governance.  We are talking about a continent with 54 countries.  Yet as we all know, democracy is fragile, as recent events in Mali have shown. Africa still has a legacy of corruption to deal with, as revealed by the indexes produced annually by Transparency International.

What research has NSI done in the area of governance of natural resources?

For almost a decade NSI has been doing field research on the subject of natural resource governance primarily in areas inhabited by first nations people in Canada and aboriginal communities in Latin America. Based on our findings we are increasingly shifting the focus of our research to sub-Saharan Africa. Our goal is to study the relationship between governance and the economic benefits of extractive activities.  Natural resources exploitation is important for all countries, and the wealth generated is critical to host governments, local communities and their populations.  Such resources should be exploited in a way which produces a win-win-win outcome:  a win for the host governments, for the local communities and for the mining companies.

What research projects does NSI work on?

We work very closely with two global initiatives. One is driven largely by the African Union and UN Economic Commission for Africa. Their African Mining Vision is an attempt to create a framework – standard setting for how African governments and investing companies should behave, and what the implications might be for home governments like Canada. A second initiative we have been involved with is led by one of the world’s leading development economists,  Prof. Paul Collier of Oxford University This initiative, the Natural Resource Charter, is also an attempt to create a set of regulatory principles by which host governments and mining companies would operate so that the exploitation of extractives as well as other natural resources, is done in an economically, socially, and environmentally responsible way producing the desired win-win-win outcome.

What should the companies do in a field of CSR when the governance is weak and civil society is not strong yet?

Let me start by explaining how we at NSI are planning to proceed in support of these global initiatives. The research we are going to undertake has several components, including the role of the private sector, the emerging powers, and going beyond CSR. We are also concerned with the impact that Canadian investments will have on long-term Canadian competitiveness and economic growth and poverty reduction in Africa. We have an interest in Canada being competitive as an investor in natural resources but at the same time we are also interested in how best that investment can enhance higher and more equitable growth outcomes.

In this context, we are also looking at the role of corporate social responsibility, including its limitations. African governments too are increasingly conscious of the limitations of self-regulation and in the context of the Africa Mining Vision are seeking to address them. Based on NSI’s past research in Canada and Latin America our conclusion is that CSR is a necessary but  not sufficient set of principles when it comes to ensuring the win-win-win outcome I referred to  earlier. Indeed a growing body of research, both empirical and academic, recognizes that there are serious limitations with relying solely on principles of corporate social responsibility. Although in general, Canadian companies have behaved well globally - often better than their competitors – a handful have not. And this has hurt both the Canadian brand and the sort of development outcomes we are all looking for from natural resource exploitation.

How has the limited scope of CSR hurt Canadian companies?

Companies have tended to rely on Corporate Social Responsibility principles alone.  But because CSR is a form of self-regulation, companies are often not accountable for whether they behave in a socially or environmentally responsible manner, especially in countries where local legislation and enforcement capacity are weak. 

Is reliance on self-regulated CSR going to produce the win-win-win outcome? What are the consequences if CSR fails to do so, especially in a context of high income inequality and poor socio-economic conditions? We have seen one possible outcome recently in the events at Marakana in South Africa where the violence in one mine has escalated and spread more widely creating a serious constraint on the country’s potential for economic growth. Incidences of violence have increased in frequency not only in Sub-Saharan Africa but also in parts of Asia and Latin America. While we recognise that CSR is necessary, we also need to ask ourselves if principles based on self-regulation are sufficient. Or do we need to look beyond CSR at more regulated forms of behaviour?

What direction is Africa moving in?

At this point it would appear that the work of the African Union and African governments is moving in the direction of stronger global standards and regulation. This may be in part due to the demands of a growing civil society in Africa demanding greater transparency and accountability.  The members of the African Union are cognisant of this important development which comes with democratic governance.

Is this what the forum you organize in May is about?

The Forum we plan to host in May of 2013 is titled  “The NSI Ottawa Forum on Governance of Natural Resources for African Development”  and we plan to have academics, CSO representatives and senior policy makers from Africa, Canada, Europe and the U.S. participating.

The Forum will examine not only how governments can best mobilize financial resources from natural resource exploitation but also how those governments can best spend the resources so that they contribute to the development of the national economy and their local communities. 

This is vital for the long term development and stability of the country. It is also vital for the mining companies themselves and their long run competitiveness. Their capacity to get contracts in the future will increasingly depend on how they are perceived both by host governments but also by the local communities.

So, you say that ...

... the more responsibly the companies behave, the more they consult with the local communities, the more positive the outcome will be in terms of strengthening their brand vis-a-vis their competitors.

But what if some investors buy up mining sites putting cash on the table, exceeding three-four times the market value?

Certainly this sort of thing happens but if that money is used for investment, to build infrastructure locally or to invest in adding value through local processing - rather than just shipping the raw minerals out – while creating more employment locally, this is going to help. This is what Canadian companies need to be doing with greater frequency, as well as talking to the local populations and taking their views into account before making investment decisions.

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Canada – 6th largest donor at the African Development Bank!

My interview with Mr. Montador, published in The Rising Africa magazine, 2012

For a while Bruce Montador was our man in Tunis: from 2007 to 2011, he represented Canada at the African Development Bank as an Executive Director. Having travelled to 28 countries in Africa either for work or fun, he shared his thorough Africa-insights with The Rising Africa.

First of all, how does the development work of AfDB differ from the one of World Bank (and the planned development bank by the BRICs)?

The AfDB has fewer resources than the World Bank has for the African region, so it needs to focus. It tries to limit its programming to a relatively few areas – infrastructure, private sector, governance and higher education. Infrastructure is critical, particularly for things like electricity, regional integration and water. The private sector is taking off – there are ever more references to Africa in the mainstream business press, but there are still many challenges facing both African and foreign entrepreneurs.

It is hard to comment on the proposed BRICs development bank, since as far as I know it is not yet operational. There is a tendency to announce projects like that without them ever doing very much for a range of practical reasons.

How does Canada participate and finance the bank? Is the contribution from Canada growing or the opposite?

Canada supports the Bank in two ways. As a shareholder, Canada’s capital pledges allow the Bank to borrow at good rates on the market, to on-lend to middle income countries and the private sector. As one of the few remaining AAA credits, Canada’s pledge is important to the Bank, particularly since Canada is already a big shareholder for our size (about 10 percent of the non-regional share).

Moreover, during the financial crisis, there was a need to increase the Bank's capital, and the temporary pledge of capital Canada made at the Pittsburgh G-20 meeting in 2009 allowed the Bank to continue to serve its members.

The other way we, Canadians support the Bank is through the budgetary grants to the African Development Fund to allow for loans and grants to low-income countries and for regional public goods. We currently give 108.5 million dollars a year – it will be up for renegotiation next year for the cycle starting in 2014. We are the 6^th largest donor, and our contribution has grown with each replenishment.

Canada is seen as an important partner – though for African Development Fund, the big players are really the Europeans – the UK, Germany and France. Canada also supports some multi-donor trust funds that do additional work – in areas like preparatory work for regional infrastructure projects and water, and for Aid for Trade.

What can Canadian companies and NGOs do to benefit from the AfBD? Please share recommendations...

Canadian consulting companies do quite well from AfDB contracts. Firms that are interested should be in touch with the Embassy in Tunis, which can help keep them informed of opportunities. Companies with bigger investment interests should check with the Bank's private sector department to see if there are possible synergies. Some NGOs may find consulting opportunities, and some of the thematic trust funds, like the Congo Basin Forest Fund, have approved projects from Canadian NGOs. AfDB does not do as much outreach to NGOs as at the World Bank, in part because NGOs have not typically paid a lot of attention to the AfDB.

What are the trends affecting the AfBD and how does it affect Canadian companies and NGOs?

The AfDB is bolstered by the growing Afro-optimism, and companies and NGOs will see growing opportunities. However, the tight fiscal environment in donor countries will probably limit growth of the concessional window, the AfDF, and thus limit growth in the Bank Group's operations in least developed countries. There may be fewer Bank contracts available in traditional areas of health and basic education. Finally, there will probably be more competition from African firms in the markets for Bank procurement.

Can you share your personal opinion on Africa’s development; say from 2007 to 2011, on the example of one or two countries of your choice?

Since my work in AfDB largely coincided with the financial crisis – I can say that Africa was doing quite well before the crisis, and was not directly touched by the financial crisis. The only country that was really integrated into the international financial system, South Africa, has a sound banking system. However, like Canada, the continent was adversely affected by the economic downturn created by the financial crisis in the US and Europe.

In addition, the nervousness of international lenders led them to pull back from marginal markets with which they were less familiar, a description which basically fit the whole of Africa. 

Fortunately, the relatively rapid recovery in Asia, and in commodity prices, as well as a return of Asian investors looking to secure supplies of commodities, helped Africa to get back on to a solid growth path relatively quickly.

That is an overview, obviously situations vary. A country like Ghana, where governance and economic reforms were well underway, and where new oil production is adding to growth, is a very positive story. Tunisia, where political uncertainty has devastated the tourist sector, has actually not done badly in terms of sustaining exports despite the weakness in the euro-zone, its main market. The East African Community has been showing fairly solid growth, based on resources but also the gains from growing integration.

Professor of economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science Alwyn Young has claimed in his research paper ‘The African growth miracle’ that Sub-Saharan living standards (as measured in ownership of durable goods, the quality of housing, the health and mortality of children, the education of youth and the allocation of female time in the household) have been growing three and a half to four times the rate indicated in international data sets.

It is an interesting analysis, and not inconsistent with the AfDB's estimates of a larger African middle class than might be expected.  However, it is still important to recognize that many of those people emerging from poverty are still relatively vulnerable; the trend is positive, but there is a long way to go. This of course also means that there is lots of scope for further strong growth.

In your view, is it justified to compare North African countries with Sub-Saharan countries – or should the stats and analysis be always separated, as two very different entities?

From the political perspective of African countries and the African Union, it is all of Africa that is the frame of reference. Obviously there are cultural and economic differences between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa but I don’t know if looking at the Middle East and North Africa together is a better framework. There are lots of differences between the Maghreb and the Mashreq.

We in CCAfrica often make country-based overviews of development (so called Monthly African Indicators), but perhaps there are other units (cities, nationality, culture etc) which would tell a better story?

With 54 countries the indicators become a sea of data, but the cities, cultures etc are open to interpretation. I would suggest looking at the five broad regions – North Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa and West Africa. There are one or two countries whose allocation is controversial or in flux, but broadly this approach produces relatively homogeneous (or less heterogeneous!) subsets. One story to tell in this context would be the relative success of regional integration in the different areas – best in East Africa and weakest, so far, in North Africa.

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