In his 2008 article, economist and author of ‘The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy’ Dani Rodrik critiques[1] the Washington Consensus as “dissipated do’s and don’ts for policymakers in developing countries”, its “confident assertions about the virtues of liberalisation, deregulations, privatization and free markets”, and its “cookie cutter policy recommendations”. He portrays the Washington Consensus, which has – in Robert Wade’s words[2] “steered economic policy around the world for the past quarter century” and in John Marangos’ words[3] “been identified as a neoliberal manifesto” – clearly as something evil and which needed to be replaced. In the same article however, Rodrik assures us that “all successful economies” engage in the global economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, stimulate saving and investment, provide market-oriented incentives, and are reasonably well governed”. Those commonalities, he assures “frame the conduct of appropriate economic policies” (ibid).
The quotes above illustrate how difficult it is to contrast the evil Washington Consensus (or globalization consensus, or neoliberal consensus, as they are often used interchangeably[4]) with something that all successful economies are founded upon. Confusion grows if one learns for example, that the free-market guru F.A. Hayek supported "a comprehensive system of social insurance" against sickness[5] and the hard-core monetarist Milton Friedman supported "a floor under the standard of life of every person in the community.[6]" Where does evil end and where do sound macroeconomic policies begin, one can wonder as a consequence.
The original wording of the Washington Consensus included principles, which taken at face value are difficult to consider as evil, for example a recommendation to redirect “public spending from subsidies toward key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment[7]”. The Washington Consensus advocated for abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, “except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds” (ibid). In addition, it also advocated “broadening the tax base”.
Considering these principles, it may be that Rodrik’s critique of the Washington Consensus refers to its practice and not the principles. These, according to the author of the term John Williamson, were simply meant to summarise a “conventional wisdom” in Washington. He says: it was “intended to be as a positive rather than normative list”[8].
This debate between Rodrik and Williamson illustrates how the outcome of the discussion depends on the precise definition of what exactly is being debated. But the inspiration for this particular essay came from the passing comments when a graduate student in International Development program advised a co-student “not to forget that neoliberalism is evil” while missing school due to illness. Perhaps meant as a joke, I nevertheless became curious what led to this conclusion of neoliberalism being evil. What was its evilness based on? This anecdotal episode inspired me to consider a case study of the University of Ottawa’s masters’ level class readings of Understanding Globalization[9] in order to analyze this linking of neoliberalism with evil. This essay asks: how is neoliberalism imagined in university readings? Is it epitomized as evil and evil only?
My aim is not to conduct a survey of how students as a group perceive neoliberalism (while that would be interesting it remains out of the scope of this project). Equally, my objective is not to conduct a substantive assessment of the practices or the principles “evilness of neoliberalism”, but rather to outline the ways neoliberalism is presented in the syllabus. While syllabi often participate in imaginary canon formation, as illustrated by the most famous “battle of the books” in the Stanford Western Culture course in 1987,[10] the canon itself is rarely an object of classroom study.[11]
Literature scholar Susan Gallagher calls these texts that are taught in university settings a pedagogical canon. What she means here is that what becomes canonical is determined by what is taught (and re-taught) in universities. While I agree with Gallagher in that canon formation is an imprecise process[12], it does take place within a certain institutional context, insuring the texts’ reproduction and reintroduction to readers, which is the point that Guillory makes in his book Cultural Capital: Problem of Literary Canon Formation.[13] Thus what is repeatedly taught and re-taught in universities constitutes canons, be they canons of literature, canons of thought, or canonical understandings of concepts, such as neoliberalism. As the construction of any syllabus begins with selection,[14] I claim that the end version of it is always somewhat political, always engaged in this canonical dialogue.
While the “essential” reading list for the Understanding Globalization class consists of heterogeneous theoretical approaches and disciplinary backgrounds, I argue that it nevertheless forms a unified “conventional information resource”.[15] It is constructed as a planned pedagogical tool and, as such, operates as a unit telling the researcher something about the canon-formation process at play in the course as a whole. As the study by Peter Stokes and Lindsey Martin[16] show, the tutors compose these reading lists in order to provide ‘sense of direction’ or, as stated in the syllabus for the Understanding Globalization class “to move graduate students towards a grounded theoretical understanding of globalization and global governance”[17]. In other words, different texts in this “information resource” are researchable as an imagined canon despite their heterogeneous disciplinarian background.
Gallagher points out that choice to include certain texts into the syllabi is done on the basis of a multitude of considerations. Sometimes it is done to address students’ imaginary beliefs already held, but often it is composed to help students transgress their social boundaries[18]. This results in a canon’s partial overlap with students’ personal social standing. Therefore a question arises, to what degree does the syllabus engage students in critical thinking regarding the beliefs already held: does it help to stretch the understandings we hold regarding neoliberalism, for example?
I argue that the school syllabi have an important influencing power to either challenge or coincide with students’ political views. Consequently I became curious whether the syllabi in globalization issues view neoliberalism one-sidedly as evil only, which would perhaps explain the inspirational incident mentioned above. Does the syllabus in question miss an opportunity to challenge students to shift their previously held beliefs about the inherent evil of neoliberalism? Or does it, instead, reinforce what they already think? Does it engage students in critical thinking (surely the aim of all university endeavours) or does it build a canonical understanding of neoliberalism as one thing and one thing only?
I agree with Gallagher’s views regarding the difficulty in the teaching process due to “increasing numbers of students from a wide variety of socioeconomic and culturally diverse backgrounds” who enter the academy. As a result, “teachability to the common reader becomes more of an issue”[19]. While Gallagher points out, that the decision of what to teach is increasingly accompanied with dilemma how to teach, in my essay I will only evaluate what is being taught in terms of ‘neoliberalism’ and not how it was taught. In the following sections, I will analyze the construction of ‘neoliberalism’ by using mostly critical discourse analysis in the particular course syllabus.
While in the syllabus we find articles by both: so-called globalizers and sceptics, the aim of this essay is to critically evaluate both sides by avoiding to prefer one to the other. Personally, I am more interested in the question of when does the understanding of “evil neoliberalism” (be it critiqued as the practice undertaken by Washington based institutions or as a summarizing conventional wisdom prevalent in Washington) become a “sound macroeconomic policy”. Is the boundary, however foggy, reflected in syllabus? My aim therefore is to outline whether the pedagogical canon as presented in the syllabus of the Understanding Globalization class seems to tilt towards the conventional wisdom of neoliberalism being evil without challenging the students’ thinking.
Analysis of the Syllabus Methodology
In order to reveal the way in which the canonical understanding of neoliberalism as evil emerges from the essential reading list, I will give a brief overview of the texts chosen for the list. There are 28 articles, book chapters or policy reports in the essential reading list in total. For my research essay, I have made two types of exclusions: discourse-based and technical. I have excluded all official reports and policy papers from the research body as my interest lies with scholarly texts. Secondly, due to time constraints, having only a week and half for conducting this study - I have excluded all those articles or book chapters, which were not searchable electronically[20]. In total, 19 articles form the basis of my research[21].
Among the predominantly male (roughly three quarters) authors in the essential reading list, there are economists, cultural theorists, social scientists, philosophers, managers and professionals of other fields. Therefore, the texts do not represent any specific field of study, but provide varied (yet male) perspectives of globalization. The geography of authors reveals that authors from BRIC-countries, which increasingly have their own understanding of globalization, were not represented. Considering Arjun Appadurai received his education in Mumbai, India, he can also be considered as representative of an “I” in the BRIC. The same can tentatively apply to Uma Kothari, who has likely of Indian heritage. Korean scholar Ha-Joon Chang adds point of view of Newly Industrialised Countries among predominantly Anglo-Saxon authors.
The reading list was divided into nine themes, corresponding to the nine weeks in the study session. It seems that the division was done not based on reasons related to the nature or the essence of globalization, but the break down was perhaps necessary to divide the workload into manageable units[22]. The breakdown clearly did not determine the structure or the content of the syllabus. Therefore I have not addressed the question of how evenly does the word ‘neoliberal’ appear in different themes.
As the texts of several authors (like the articles of David Dollar and Aart Kraay, and also of Allan Bird and Michael Stevens) did not contain the word 'neoliberalism', their texts do not appear in the study. In itself, the absence of word ‘neoliberalism’ in the globalization champions’ texts is quite amusing. Some globalization scholars are obviously more obsessed with the term, while others rarely mention it (Saskia Sassen, to my mind, mentioned the neoliberalism once in no particular context). Terrorism theme, present in the essential reading list, for example did not contain word neoliberalism at all, and is therefore not represented in this study.
Although the detailed quantitative research would reveal the more detailed picture of the occurrence of neoliberalism in the syllabus, this paper is based on qualitative research of evil discourse of neoliberalism.
Evil or not: how is neoliberalism defined anyway?
Tore Fougner seems to be the only author in the essential reading list who admits[23] the difficulty in defining neoliberalism, as it “is a highly contested concept in contemporary public and scholarly debates.” And “not only are there many different conceptions of neoliberalism, but some scholars even argue that ‘there is no such thing as neoliberalism’”(ibid). Robert Wade in contrast points out[24] rather matter-of-factly, that the “notions of Washington Consensus, globalization consensus and neoliberal consensus are being used interchangeably”, dismissing the historical or substantial differences between them.
Peter Evans clarifies that this is the realist perspective, which denies the existence of neoliberalism. According to this world-view, he writes[25], “we live in a pseudo-liberal world where powerful nation states in general, and the United States in particular, pursue mercantilist and imperialist policies at the expense of both economic rationality and an equitable world order.” He adds[26] that “neo-liberalism is congenitally blind to the need for social protection”.
Lesley Gill briefly defines[27] neoliberalism in a footnote: "Neoliberalism refers to the thinking and policies that advocate rule of the market and the unrestrained movement of capital and that champion the centrality of the individual and individual entrepreneurialism. Proponents of neoliberalism support deregulation, privatization, deunionization, “flexible” labour regimes, and the withdrawal of the state from social service provision." Note the slight but substantial difference with the definitions brought above by F.A. Hayek and Friedman.
Additionally, neoliberalism seems to be loosely defined as capitalist evil towards “downsized workers, ruined peasants, and impoverished urbanites” who became all increasingly “superfluous to neoliberal capitalism”[28].
Considering the term neoliberalism is so loosely (if at all) defined, this must be taken into consideration while evaluating any critique towards it (regardless whether its practices in action or original summary of principles). Note that Gill, for example, uses the word ‘neoliberal’ 28 times in her article without offering any source reference in support of her footnoted definition of it.
What neoliberalism is NOT
It seems that sometimes it is easier to define what neoliberalism is not, than to define what it is. In the texts, neoliberalism is defined as distinct from an Asian model, distinct from Keynesian model, and it is distinct from being liberal. Linda Weiss[29] for example contrasts neoliberalism with the Asian model, which does not have “blind followers” like neoliberalism. She also[30],points out that neoliberalism as a macroeconomic policy has been contrasted with the Keynesian model, whereas she adds that they are quite similar in some regard[31].
Tore Fougner dedicates much of his text to discuss a difference between the neoliberals and classical liberals, as they both use “the vocabulary of ‘market’, ‘competition’, ‘efficiency’, ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’, as well as the constitution of ‘the market’ as the ideal in relation to which governance should be oriented”. He then draws our attention to the ‘significant differences’ between them[32]. He stresses that the difference lies in the government’s active role in creating “certain political, legal and institutional conditions” for the market[33]. Fougner concludes that neoliberalism differs from liberalism by the degree of “rational conduct of individuals”, which he claims, is artificially arranged[34]. Unlike liberals, the neoliberals task government to construct conditions that will enable “an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be played to the best effect.[35]”
In an attempt to further define neoliberalism through the relationship with the state, Guillen[36] adds that “neoliberal ideology is against the state”, which in combination with Fougner’s remarks on the government’s active role in deployment of neoliberalism, leaves an impression of a state machine, which is actively dismantling itself. From those conflicting statements regarding its relationship with the state, neoliberalism is not necessarily presented as evil, but rather as … just plain absurd.
Globalisation = neoliberalism … or not?
Is globalization the same as neoliberalism? If not, my interest lies in how the two are distinguished in terms of their “imaginary evilness”. Among the authors chosen in the syllabus’ essential reading list, there are mixed references. Some authors, like Robert Wade make no distinction between globalization and neoliberalism, defining them both "in a nutshell" as the “dominant economic narrative” for the past three decades[37]. Wade defines global neoliberalism agenda as the “one of trade opening, financial opening, privatization, and deregulation with some good governance, civil society and environmental protection thrown in” [38] omitting again the social components foreseen in 10 principles in Washington Consensus.
Other authors imagine globalization to be a broader notion, which incorporates neoliberalism. Evans[39] for example, routinely refers to the ‘neo-liberal globalization’ indicating that there must be other types of globalization as well. He does indeed talk about “generic globalization” which is different from neoliberal globalization. He defines this latter notion as “a shrinking geographical area”, with unchallenged transportation systems but increasingly porous “physical and political boundaries that have followed from the twentieth century’s revolutionary transformation of information and communication technologies.”
He seems to be considering the generic globalization to be less evil, as the neoliberal globalization “uses the tools of generic globalization”… “to construct a global system of domination”[40]. Due to the distinction of generic and neoliberal globalization, I have included domination as one facet of its evilness. Evans further defines neoliberal globalization through a burden it lays on communities and through a failure in implanting global democracy[41].
Ray Kiely[42] seems to be hesitant about mentally connecting the globalization and neoliberalism: he refers to “unambiguously pro-globalisation policies” or “globalization-friendly” and “neo-liberalism”, using ambiguous ‘and/or’ while combining these two, without offering details what would distinguish the two processes.
Guillen disagrees with Wade’s argument about domination, which I referred to earlier, by stating “globalization should refer to the processes, qualities, and conditions that are not set into motion or dominated by any one model, paradigm or worldview.” He then adds: “Neoliberals and Marxists who see the dominant worldview contest this view”[43] (this way indirectly placing Wade and Evans who talk about ‘dominance’ into the Marxist camp, which I would be hesitant to do).
Guillen[44] is the one, who attempts to distinguish globalization and neoliberalism by referring to historical events. He states: “the story of globalization” began “with the unraveling pax americana in the early 1970s” whereas “the rise of neoliberal ideology” took place “in the late 1970s and early1980s. He also attempts to define the difference between the globalization and neoliberal ideology, which according to him lays in the different relationship to the state: it is the neoliberal ideology, associated with the globalization”, that is against the state – not inextricably the globalization[45]. And in that context of state relationship, it is again neoliberalism, which seems to be more evil than globalization.
Most of all, neoliberalism is defined through globalization and is presented in the syllabus readings as something American or as an American model[46], as Weiss clearly illustrates. Evans also points out the America’s peculiar cultural affinity for the neo-liberal version[47] and that according to some “the failures of the current neoliberal order are rooted in the perverse behaviour of the United States as a global hegemon”[48]. As such, neoliberalism is constructed to be stubborn, awkward or dominant, i.e. rather unpleasant.
Neoliberalism is further located on the American map by pointing to Chicago: it is defined through the University of Chicago or Chicago school of economics, “which conceived of all human behaviour in economic-rational terms, and envisaged a ‘purely economic method of programming the totality of governmental action’”[49]. Other neoliberal epicentres include Washington, where World Bank, IMF, WTO headquarters are located. The epicentres include the U.S. and the UK treasuries and newspapers like The Financial Times and The Economist[50] – all belonging to the Anglo-Saxon sphere of culture. Tore Fougner adds Switzerland to the mental landscape of neoliberalism as it hosts both World Economic Forum and International Institute for Management Development, as they are “aiming to direct governments towards neoliberalism”[51].
When did the evilness begin and who embodies it?
Unlike the vagueness regarding the definition of neoliberalism, there does seem to be a broad-based-agreement among the authors when exactly did neoliberalism develop. The same unified understanding seems to be regarding the neoliberal personas, too.
Different authors point to slightly different dates in their attempt to pinpoint the beginning of neoliberalism but as a result, a more or less agreeable lineage of dates forms. Despite the Evans’ article, which examines the relevance of Polanyi’s double movement (written during the WWII-era) under neoliberal conditions, other authors clearly imagine neoliberalism as a post-1945 phenomenon[52] – more precisely it is tied to the end of the 70s and to the beginning of 80s. Chang[53] and Wade both mentally connect the neoliberal consensus to 80s or to the “early days” of the Reagan and Thatcher governments, which are respectively 1979 and 1981[54]. Wade assures us that while the neoliberal consensus has recently been weakened, it is “not yet dead”[55].
Regarding the personification of neoliberalism, the texts reveal the tendency to divide the personalities in the neoliberalism discourse into good and bad guys. Curiously though (but in accordance with the timeline of neoliberalism illustrated above), no references to the monetarist Milton Friedman can be found in the texts of the essential reading list[56]. Fougner refers to Hayek in his text in the context of “a discovery device for better policy approaches” but does not offer further clarification or critique.
Instead, “the bad guys” of neoliberalism equal[57] with Thatcher[58] and Reagan – the prime minister of United Kingdom and the U.S. president respectively. By referring to Thatcher as a ‘baroness’57, her imaginary belonging to the world of noblemen in a rather feudal class and her detachment from contemporary times is stressed. This impression of evilness is further stressed by Evans who calls her views ‘anachronistic’[59]. Thatcher‘s quote[60] “It is our job to glory in inequality and see what talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all,” portrays her as a champion of the most evil form of neoliberalism.
In Gill’s article[61] about solidarity, Coca-Cola surfaces as an embodiment of evil neoliberalism.
Remarkably, the readings reveal that not only conservative politicians champion evil version of globalization and neoliberalism, but also “political parties which call themselves center-left, like the British Labour Party”. Wade assures[62] us that it “remains deeply committed to globalization and neoliberalism as the right direction of travel, not least because they depend on media and financial support from private economic interests deeply committed to these policies and their justifying ideas”.
In addition to identifying the bad guys, other personas have been mentioned, too: Joe Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur, for example. Despite their employment in the neoliberalism evil epicentre World Bank, Wade assures[63] us that they are “not noted champions of neoliberal economics.”
As a result, the texts in the syllabus leave an impression of dual opposition: on one side, there is the rather evil “neoliberal” camp who seems to be participating in “unleashed globalization forces”, and on the other side, there is the “anti-neoliberal” camp, which “embraces a much wider range of solutions”[64]. However, the finer features on which basis the distinction was made are not expanded. How can someone who is employed by the imaginary “centre of evilness” World Bank, for example, not be “noted champion” of evilness? Is it perhaps related to the timeline of neoliberalism and its imaginary peaks of severity of evilness, the syllabus material does not clarify.
It is fully possible that Wade’s analysis is much more nuanced than it was possible to conclude based on his two articles. This allows one to conclude that the embodiment of neoliberalism can be remarkably ambiguous, not black and white. Syllabus however does not offer guidance how to forward the thought of students.
Neoliberalism is demagogical, violent, clever, greedy, and radical
In following paragraphs, we learn that evilness of neoliberalism is portrayed to be demagogical, violent, clever, greedy and radical. In this evilness discourse, two major sub-discourses emerge: first, “neoliberalism is demagogical”; and secondly, it is associated with violence. Robert Wade[65],[66],[67],[68],[69],[70] and Ha-Joon Chang[71],[72] are the leading agents of the “neoliberalism is demagogical”-discourse, as they methodologically track the way data has been untruthfully combined and presented by IMF and World Bank.
In addition to the liar-concept of neoliberalism, it is directly associated with (political) violence[73],[74],[75],[76],[77], [78],[79] in the article of Lesley Gill, who documents the workers’ struggle against the multinational corporation Coca-Cola. In it, it has been mentioned: the workers understood the “connections between political violence and neoliberalism”. This evilness seems to be a consequence of neoliberal policies but curiously, violence is also described as prerequisite for creating conditions for neoliberal takeover[80]. The forceful nature of neoliberalism[81],[82],[83] is further illustrated through describing people who are being forced to do something by neoliberalism they would not otherwise do.
In addition to the demagogy- and the violence-discourses of neoliberalism, critical discourse analysis of the texts in the essential reading list reveals that neoliberalism is also portrayed as anti-health[84], anti-nature[85], clever[86],[87] greedy or profit-hungry[88],[89],[90], radical[91], occasionally as ignorant in its profit-hunger84, [92], [93] and dominating over us[94],[95].
Therefore, it seems, indeed, that in the Understanding Globalization syllabus, neoliberalism is dominantly portrayed as evil, while its evilness is fascinatingly multifaceted.
***
I am intrigued how has the cookie-cutter-approach, which Rodrik critiqued at the beginning of the essay, been portrayed in the syllabus? Was the coercion of neoliberalism onto the powerless Africa and Latin America during the 70-80s through IMF- and WB-led intrusion reflected in the reading material?
Fougner[96] seems to agree with coercion by the IMF and the World Bank, but he also points out that “some governments have moved in a neoliberal direction independently of what other governments do”. While Mohan also agrees that coercion has been largely the case[97], he also begs to view this issue differently: “Most critical studies of the neoliberal state in Africa take a very external view, with the Washington institutions simply exporting and imposing a series of polices.[98]” He continues: “While conditionality has been, and remains, a major issue in donor - state relations, it is important to see neoliberal polities constructed in … other ways, as well”97. Chang points out that most developing countries “have come to embrace policy reform” in a neo-liberal direction[99].
Linda Weiss also rejects[100] the claim of neoliberalism being exclusively an act of coercion: “The fact that not all governments follow neoliberal dictums surely throws into question the central assumptions of the powerlessness argument.” But she does not talk about Africa or Latin America but Asian countries.
References to this coercion can be revealed in Fougner’s text, as well. He states[101] that “there is nothing natural or given about states striving to improve their so-called national competitiveness”. Curiously, he only refers[102] to the Scandinavian welfare states like Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands (and not to UK or the U.S. - the embodiments of evil neoliberalism) who adopted the neoliberal benchmarking exercises (but which are rarely portrayed in evil neoliberal context due to their social democratic welfare systems). This mentioning of Nordic welfare states in the context of ‘unnatural’ neoliberalism falls out of black and white portrayal of neoliberalism.
In conclusion, the texts in the essential reading list seem to reflect the fact that there is no single source of evil neoliberal governance within states: while some countries have been coerced into neoliberalism, there have been others who have adopted it voluntarily. Even if these other cases have not been analysed in detail, the reading list does not convey the image of complete standardisation of evil neoliberal governance. Therefore, from the coercion-discourse point of view, the ‘evilness’ has been supplemented with other versions of neoliberalism. Among authors, Evans and Fougner have therefore contributed to adding varied tones in addition to the “evil neoliberalism” discourse, which is noteworthy.
Perhaps neoliberalism is not so evil after all?
In the essential readings’ texts, there are several references to neoliberalism, which not did construct it necessarily as evil. Fougner, for example, points out that the dominance of neoliberalism varies even in the seemingly most neoliberal countries[103] indicating that the hypothetical evilness of neoliberalism can be combined with grayer shades or perhaps even with more lighter tones. Guillen also explores the debate whether a social welfare state can coexist with globalization, and concludes that unfortunately, despite of the empirical evidence, which proves that it is possible, ‘gloomy forecasts’ have become ‘conventional wisdom among neoliberal policy makers and journalists’[104].
While Ray Kiely gives neoliberals credit for pointing out limited successes of China[105], Peter Evans goes even further and tests our tolerance by painting a picture of a possibility of “neoliberalism as a golden age” in retrospect if violent and regressive social movements become dominant successor to the neoliberal globalization[106]. He then returns to the threatening “neoliberalism is evil” discourse by stating that “extending the life of neoliberalism is probably the best way to provide political nourishment to regressive social movements”. He urges the “progressive movements for social protection” to succeed in “addressing the failures of neoliberalism”.
Conclusion
One can conclude from the discourse analysis above that the texts in the essential reading list overwhelmingly portray neoliberalism as evil indeed, as hypothesized at the beginning of this essay. It can be that the failures of certain ideologies tend to be stressed over whatever successes it may have. Despite largely failing to provide clear definition of it across the texts, the evilness of neoliberalism is portrayed as multidimensional, threatening and scary. Regarding the references to its time-line, the neoliberal era of evilness has a quite precise starting point – around late 70s, early 80s – and it continues till present day. Its dual epicentre lies in Washington and in Chicago and it is represented by Washington based institutions most of all.
Most interesting phenomenon concerns neoliberal personifications. While lacking references to the free-market ideologists Hayek or Freedman, the embodiments of neoliberalism are portrayed to be active on both sides of the political spectrum: Thatcher/Reagan on the right are comparable with center-left wing British Labour Party in their evilness. Some personas are portrayed to be working behind the so-called enemy line, against the institutions’ philosophy, which employs them: World Bank’s Stiglitz, for example. This, together with the Nordic countries being mentioned in the neoliberalism context breaks the image of neoliberalism as evil and evil only. Yet, the shades of gray have not been defined or clarified for students explicitly.
The dominant discourse of ultimate evilness is somewhat supplemented with other images of neoliberalism. The syllabus avoids building a canonical understanding of neoliberalism exclusively as evil and evil only, which is remarkable. The biggest diversion in hypothesised evilness of neoliberalism rests in the way the coercion or the cookie-cutter-approach was constructed. The global evilness can indeed be stemming from local sources, as the syllabus material eloquently demonstrated. It seems to imply that Rodrik’s criticism of neoliberal cookie cutter policy recommendations is partially groundless. On some cases, neoliberalism was not imagined as evil at all, and most surprising is the possibility of “neoliberalism as golden age” in a likely (however horrifying) retrospect.
What about the imaginary boundary between the evil neoliberalism and sound macroeconomic policies? Was this clearly defined in the syllabus readings? I would say no. There were un-usual suspects of globalization – like the so called Nordic Nanny States – mentioned in the evil benchmarking context, but the boundary between good and evil was not clearly marked, not analyzed further.
While it is true that syllabi can play a significant role in how students change or hold onto their existing political understanding of the world, it can be concluded from the dominance of evilness-discourse that syllabus did little for those students who wished to see a more nuanced representation of neoliberalism, especially regarding what can be considered as sound macroeconomic policies. The question, where does evil neoliberalism end and sound economic policies begin, for example at the case of Nordic social welfare states, remained unanswered. Therefore, syllabus seemed to miss the opportunity to challenge the preconceived ideas of neoliberalism and further promote critical thinking.
On the other hand, it must be noted that while syllabus can influence students’ thinking, the degree of this varies depending on student’s “lived experience and emotion in experience”106. Stokes and Martin who study student perceptions and expectations towards reading lists argue that not only syllabus is political. So is the reading process by the student, which can be viewed “as an existential act and very much intertwined with a given person’s values or beliefs”[108]. Therefore, regardless how the syllabus presents certain notions, the end result of this influencing process depends “upon the discourse between tutor and student that makes explicit the tutor’s expectations around the purpose of the list”.
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Wade, R. H. (2004). Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? World Development, 32 (4), 567-589.
Wade, R. H. (2009). Is the Globalization Consensus Dead? Antipode, 41 (1), 142-165.
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Annex 1.
Body of articles
1. Guillen, M.F. 2001 ‘Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature’, Annual Review of Sociology 27:235-260.
2. Wade, R. 2010 ‘Is the Globalization Consensus Dead?, Antipode 41(1):142-165.
3. Weiss, L. 1997 ‘The Myth of the Powerless State’, New Left Review
4. Sassen, S. 2005 ‘When National Territory is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel
Borderings’, New Political Economy 10(4):523-541.
5. Fougner, T. 2008 ‘Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing and Country Benchmarking’, Millennium 37(2):303-326.
6. Chang, 2003 ‘Kicking away the Ladder: Infant Industry Promotion in Historical
Perspective’, Oxford Development Studies 31(1):21-32.
7. Bird, A. and Stephens, M.J. 2003 ‘Towards and Emergent Global Culture and the Effects on Obsolescing National Cultures’, Journal of International Management
9(4):395-407.
8. Ohemeng, F. 2005 ‘Getting the State Right: Think Tanks and the Dissemination of New
Public Management Ideas in Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies 43(3):443-465.
9. Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. 2002 ‘Spreading the Wealth’, Foreign Affairs January/February: 120-133
10. Kiely, R. 2008. Poverty's Fall/China's Rise: Global Convergence or New
Forms of Uneven Development? Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (3):353-372.
11. Wade, Robert H. 2004. Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? World
Development 32 (4):567-589.
12. Igoe, J. 2006 ‘Becoming Indigenous Peoples: Difference, Inequality and the Globalization of East African Identity Politics’, African Affairs 105(420):399-420
13. Kothari, U (Kothari, 2008). 2008 ‘Global Peddlers and Local Networks’, Environment
and Planning D: Society and Space 26(3):500-516.
14. (Mohan G, 2008), 2008, ‘Making Neoliberal States of Development: The Ghanaian
Diaspora and the Politics of Homelands’, Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 26(3):464 – 479
15. Bartelson, J. 2006 ‘Making Sense of Global Civil Society’, European Journal of International Relations 12(3):371-395.
16. Evans, P. 2008 ‘Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?’, Politics & Society 36(2):271-305
17. Gill, L. 2009 ‘The Limits of Solidarity: Labor and Transnational Organizing
against Coca-Cola’, American Ethnologist 34(6):667-680
18. Cronin, A.K. 2002/3 ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’,
International Security 27(3):30-58.
19. Beall, J., Goodfellow, T. & Putzel, J. 2006 ‘Policy Arena: On the Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development’ Journal of International Development 18(1): 51-67
[1] (Rodrik, 2008), p. 1
[2] (Wade R. H., 2009), p. 142.
[3] (Marangos, 2009), p. 197
[4] (Wade R. H., 2009), p. 145.
[5] (Hayek, 2007), p. 148.
[6] (Friedman, 1962), p. 191.
[7] (Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, 1990), accessed in http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486
[8] (Williamson, 1993), p. 1329.
[9] Or MDG5120A
[10] (Gallagher, 2001), p.53
[11] Ibid.
[12] ibid. p. 54.
[13] Quoted in Gallagher, 2001, p. 55.
[14] Quoted in Gallagher, 2001, p. 61.
[15] (Stokes & Martin, 2008), p. 113.
[16] (Stokes & Martin, 2008), p. 116.
[17] (Abrahamsen, 2011)
[18] (Gallagher, 2001), p. 64.
[19] (Gallagher, 2001), p. 66.
[20] This excluded authors like Joseph Stiglitz.
[21] See exact list in Annex 1.
[22] Compare for example with the sister seminar MDG5120B, which is composed of different units regarding its themes.
[23] (Fougner, 2008), p. 306.
[24] The Washington Consensus, or globalization consensus, or neoliberal consensus—these phrases are used interchangeably—was transmitted into policies and institutions around the world not only through graduate education in economics but also through the conditions on access to resources. (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 145.
[25] (Evans, 2008), p. 282.
[26] (Evans, 2008), p. 277
[27] (Gill, 2009), p. 678.
[28] (Gill, 2009), p. 671
[29] One further implication is that, as the advantages of coordinated market economies continue to be highlighted, potential adaptors of the Asian model are more likely to emerge—at least in the Asian region—than blind followers of the neoliberal model of capitalism. (Weiss, 1997), p.23.
[30] The whole issue of state capacity for economic adjustment has been misleadingly cast as a choice between either Keynesian or neoliberal macro-economic policies. Since they are both macroeconomic in focus, they are, to say the least, a choice between highly restricted alternatives. (Weiss, 1997), p.18.
[31] Both Keynesian and neoliberal policies are similar in this regard, implying a focus on short-term macroeconomic objectives. In both cases, the instruments of intervention are predetermined; there is little room for creative adjustment. This may, of course, account for the greater appeal of macroeconomic policy in settings lacking strong state traditions. (Weiss, 1997), p. 19.
[32] (Fougner, 2008), p. 307.
[33] (Fougner, 2008), p. 308.
[34] Furthermore, and although both forms of liberalism tie the rationality of government to the rational conduct of individuals, neoliberals conceive of such conduct not as part of human nature, but rather as ‘artificially arranged or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals’. (Fougner, 2008), p. 308.
[35] Lastly, neoliberals go further than classical liberals in defining positive tasks for governmental activism – including, not least, the task of ‘constructing the … conditions that will enable an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be played to best effect’. (Fougner, 2008), p. 308.
[36] In a more empirically grounded way, Evans (1997, pp.82-87) points out that the globalization undermines the state because its associated neoliberal ideology is against the state and not because globalization is inextricably against the state. He further argues that the state may stage a comeback if there is a return of the ideological pendulum, or a transformation of the state and a development of new elements of state-society synergy. (Guillen, 2001), p. 248.
[37] (Wade R. H., 2009), p. 142.
[38] The Bank is committed to an Official View of how countries should seek poverty reduction, rooted in the neoliberal agenda of trade opening, financial opening, privatization, deregulation, with some good governance, civil society and environmental protection thrown in; it is exposed to arm-twisting by the G7 member states and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); it must secure their support and defend itself against criticism. (Wade R. H., 2004)
[39] (Evans, 2008)
[40] (ibid, p. 275.)
[41] Ideologically, neoliberal globalization creates two kinds of opportunity. It imposes unbearable risks on communities and families while refusing compensatory social protection, and it enthrones the normative value of democracy while being completely unwilling and incapable of implementing genuine democratic rule, most blatantly at the global level. (Evans, 2008)
[42] (Kiely, 2008), p. 353.
[43] (Guillen, 2001), p. 252.
[44] (Guillen, 2001), p. 237.
[45] (Guillen, 2001), p. 248.
[46] Globalists therefore predict convergence on neoliberalism as an increasing number of states adopt the low-taxing, market-based ideals of the American model. (Weiss, 1997), p. 4.
[47] The United States was not only an enthusiastic promoter of the existing capitalist world order, but turned out to have a peculiar cultural affinity for the neo-liberal version. (Evans, 2008), p. 284.
[48] (Evans, 2008), p. 281.
[49] (Fougner, 2008), p. 307.
[50] This line of argument is championed by the more powerful of the centers of ‘‘thinking for the world’’ that influence international policy making, including the inter-governmental organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, also the US and UK Treasuries, and opinion-shaping media such as The Financial Times and The Economist. (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 568.
[51] (Fougner, 2008), p. 303.
[52] For example, in his attempt to define neoliberalism historically, Fougner[52] quotes Foucault who defined neoliberalism as the “so-called Ordoliberalen in post-1945 West Germany” (Fougner, 2008), p. 307.
[53] Fortunately, it is said, interventionist policies have been largely abandoned across the world since the 1980s with the rise of neo-liberalism, which emphasize the virtues of small government, laissez-faire policies and international openness. (Chang, 2003), p. 22.
[54] The neoliberal argument says that inequality provides incentives for effort and risk-taking, and thereby raises efficiency. As Margaret Thatcher put it, ‘‘It is our job to glory in inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all.’’ (Wade R. H., 2004)
[55] (Wade R. H., 2009).
[56] I find the lack of references to M. Friedman peculiar, as the epicenter of evil neoliberalism Chicago University became one of world’s leading academic economic forums under his influence. Monetarism became prominent in the 60s.
[57] (Wade R. H., 2009), p. 161.
[58] Note that Thatcherism is associated more often than Reaganism[58] with neoliberalism. Could this be due to the dominance of males among the authors who pick on the female opponent instead of criticising more heavy weight Friedman and Hayek … or even Reagan[58]?
[59] (Evans, 2008), p. 276.
[60] (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 582
[61] They saw the lawsuit as one tactic in a broader struggle against Coca-Cola and the neoliberal policies of the Colombian state. (Gill, 2009), p.672.
[62] (Wade R. H., 2009), p. 144.
[63] (Wade R. H., 2004) p. 574.
[64] (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 568.
[65] In the end, the interests of the rich and powerful should, objectively, line up in favor of greater equity in the world at large, because some of the effects of widening inequality may contaminate their lives and those of their children. This fits the neoliberal argument. (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 576.
[66] The neoliberal argument says that the distribution of income between all the world’s people has become more equal over the past two decades and the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen, for the first time in more than a century and a half. (Wade R. H., 2004), 567.
[67] Evidence from the current long wave of globalization thus confirms neoliberal economic theory––more open economies are more prosperous, economies that liberalize more experience a faster rate of progress, and people who resist further economic liberalization must be acting out of vested or ‘‘rent-seeking’’ interests. (Wade R. H., 2004), 567.
[68] But the route to greater equity goes not only through the dismantling of market rules rigged in favor of the rich––also consistent with the neoliberal argument––but through more political (non-market) influence on resource allocation in order to counter the tendency of free markets to concentrate incomes and power. This requires international public policy well beyond the boundaries of neoliberalism. (Wade R. H., 2004), 583.
[69] Proposition 4. Between-country world PPP-income inequality has been constant or falling since around 1980, with countries weighted by population. This is the result that the neoliberal argument celebrates. (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 576.
[70] The world poverty headcount could move in one direction while world in equality moved in the other. The neoliberal argument says that they have both dropped. (Wade R. H., 2004), p. 574.
[71] The few neoliberal economists who are aware of the records of protectionism in the now developed countries or NDCs try to avoid the obvious conclusion—that it can be very useful for economic development—by arguing that, while some (minimal) tariff protection may be necessary, most developing countries have tariff rates that are much higher than those used by most NDCs in the past. (Chang, 2003), p. 27.
[72] Neo-liberal economists are therefore faced with a paradox here. The developing countries grew much faster when they used “bad” policies during 1960–80 than when they used “good” (at least “better”) policies during the following two decades. (Chang, 2003), p. 28.
[73] SINALTRAINAL leaders understood the connections between political violence and neoliberalism, and it should come as no surprise that they infused the human rights frame with their own understandings of class-based politics. (Gill, 2009), p. 674.
[74] SINALTRAINAL trade unionists and many other Colombian workers claimed that company managers worked together with the paramilitaries to rid workplaces of both troublesome workers who resisted neoliberalism and the unions they led. (Gill, 2009), p. 670.
[75] Because of a justifiable fear of diluting the lawsuit, lawyers did not contextualize human rights crimes within the long history of class struggle between workers and the company, the rise of a unified labour movement in the mid-1980s, or the intensification of anti-union violence after the Colombian government enacted neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Gill 2007), p. 672.
[76] My discussion illustrates how Colombian workers struggled to construct new alliances to contend with the chaos that political violence and neoliberalism wrought on their lives, and it examines the tensions and disjunctures that arose within emergent activist coalitions. (Gill, 2009), p. 668.
[77] The violence weakened or destroyed trade unions at a time when the enactment of neoliberal economic reforms was generating opposition from broad sectors of Colombian society. (Gill, 2009), p. 670.
[78] The paramilitary assault against trade unionists had attained its maximum intensity, and the anti-worker violence was bolstering the aim of the Colombian government and global firms to restructure the labour force in accord with neoliberal principles. (Gill, 2009), p. 677.
[79] There was no conceptual or political link between the goal of policy makers in Washington and Bogot´ to enact a neoliberal agenda in Colombia and the ways that political violence, perpetrated by right-wing mercenaries tied to the state, local elites, and global corporations, was prying apart social relationships and incorporating vulnerable working people into new relationships of inequality. (Gill, 2009), p. 674.
[80] The lawsuit arose at a moment when terror and widespread impunity for the perpetrators of torture, extrajudicial executions, and wholesale massacres were creating the political conditions necessary for the neoliberal transformation of the economy. (Gill, 2009), p. 670.
[81] As historically weak (or nonexistent) welfare states, further undermined by neoliberal rollback, withdraw from welfare support people are urged, or forced, to rely on a range of individuals and groups. (Mohan G, 2008), p. 472.
[82] Most of the activities of the hometown association involve public goods and tend to fill the gap either never filled by the state or vacated by it as a result of neoliberal adjustment. (Mohan G, 2008), p. 474.
[83] Neoliberal property rights and globalized consumption patterns keep rents flowing from Southern consumers to Northern corporations, while only a small fraction of the South’s “human capital” is allowed to generate returns from the productive ideas that are monopolized by these same corporations. (Evans, 2008), p. 278-9.
[84] Health care is the archetypal case. It can be considered a fundamental component of social protection whose core components should be treated as collective goods with positive spill-overs, or it can be treated simply as a commodity. The latter choice, associated with lower overall health performance relative to resources expended, flows naturally from the logic of neo-liberalism. (Evans, 2008), p. 277.
[85] Stewardship of the environment is the archetypal collective good and illustrates the way in which the consequences of failure to deliver such goods have been magnified during the period between classic liberalism’s early-twentieth century crisis and neo-liberalism’s current efforts. Nature has always been what Polanyi called a “fictitious commodity.” (Evans, 2008), p. 277.
[86] Even the most ardent supporters of global neo-liberalism acknowledge the disjunction between the scope of the market and the scope of political authority. (Evans, 2008), p. 280.
[87] As transnational financial managers and entrepreneurs have learned to take advantage of both the revolution in information technology and the new rules instituted in response to neo-liberal ideology, financial flows have expanded at multiples of the rate of expansion of global production and trade, and the frequency of international “financial crises” has expanded along with the magnitude of financial flows. (Evans, 2008), 280.
[88] Politically protected monopoly rents are at the heart of profitability in the most advanced sectors of the global neo-liberal economy. (Evans, 2008), p. 278.
[89] Global neo-liberalism’s focus on preserving monopoly control over ideas whose unfettered use would multiple our ability to satisfy human needs connects back directly to failure to provide social protection. (Evans, 2008), p. 279.
[90] Genuine ideological conviction that regulation reduces efficiency, combined with short-sighted self-interest in being able to profit from the absence of governance, leaves neo-liberal elites incapable of constructing even the order that they need for their own long-term accumulation of capital. (Evans, 2008), p. 280.
[91] In contrast to the claims made by neoliberalism, as well as some radical theories of dependency and underdevelopment, capital is attracted to areas of established capital accumulation, where increasing returns can be derived from lower relative costs. (Kiely, 2008), p. 368.
[92] Economic underperformance is a symptom of the broader failure of neo-liberal governance. State apparatuses, the traditional vehicle of enforcing collective social agendas, have lost the ability to discipline private economic elites, even in the sense of forcing them to face the discipline of real market competition. (Evans, 2008), p. 280.
[93] Far from maximizing economic accumulation, neo-liberalism acts as a fetter on the effective application of the most important modern “forces of production”—ideas and human capital. (Evans, 2008), p. 279.
[94] Yet fighting abusive corporate practices could not encompass the more complicated problem of the dispossession and reconfiguration of the working class and the re-emergence of the state in defense of class privilege under neoliberalism in both Colombia and the United States. (Gill, 2009), p. 667.
[95] This new working class was most evident in Colombian cities, where ruined peasants, downsized workers, and the marginalized urban poor contended with each other for diminishing returns in the informal economy and had become ever more superfluous to capital accumulation under neoliberalism (Gill 2009); The student focus on Coca-Cola and its iconic image was a manifestation of the identity politics that intensified under neoliberalism and that, with episodic exceptions, such as the 1930s, have informed political debate in the United States. (Gill, 2009); Furthermore, the anti–Coca-Cola campaign, like other transnational labour campaigns, targeted the branded image of a large corporation and focused on extreme violations— the murder of trade unionists—rather than the quotidian abuses suffered by Colombian workers under neoliberalism. (Gill, 2009), p. 669
[96] While much governmentality research has focused on how neoliberalism has come to inform multiple practices on the part of state authorities, the argument here is that states are themselves increasingly subjected to a form of neoliberal governance in the contemporary world political economy – in the sense that they are constituted and acted upon as subjects with a rationality derived from arranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive behaviour. (Fougner, 2008), p. 308.
[97] As a result of neoliberal conditionality, states in Africa, and elsewhere, are being pressed to be financially sustainable and so seek creative ways of enhancing inflows of capital (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). However, many of these states are sufficiently fragile that they cannot open up the political process. (Mohan G, 2008), p. 465.
[98] (Mohan G, 2008), p. 466.
[99] As a result, most developing countries have come to embrace “policy reform” in a neo-liberal direction. (Chang, 2003), p. 22.
[100] Far from acting in concordance with neoliberal prescriptions, Germany (that is, formerly West Germany), which remained aloof from Keynesianism for much of the post-war period, has recently sustained a massive tax levy to help finance unification. (Weiss, 1997), p. 15.
[101] (Fougner, 2008), p. 326.
[102] (Fougner, 2008), p. 322.
[103] “Furthermore, even in states that appear to be neoliberal all the way through, it would be an exaggeration to say that it is all neoliberalism and nothing else.” (Fougner, 2008), p. 323.
[104] (Guillen, 2001), p 250.
[105] In this respect, neo-liberals are correct to point to the limited successes of China's national champion policy, but as has been seen, this argument ignores the reasons why the Chinese state has employed such a policy in the first place. (Kiely, 2008), p. 367.
[106] (Evans, 2008), p. 286.
[107] See for example the syllabus of prof. Chris Blattman of Yale University, who states in his African Poverty & Western Aid syllabus that: “The books you’ll read and critique are the new canon of development. Perhaps not coincidentally, they are mostly written by rich, white, male academics. They also tend to dwell on failures, rather than successes. You’ll read these perspectives, but the readings will also emphasize African voices and positive achievements as well.” http://chrisblattman.com/files/2012/01/PLSC170-Syllabus-2012.pdf?9d7bd4
[108] (Stokes & Martin, 2008), p. 115-116
