Globalization can be defined through several angles: economic, cultural or political, and accordingly, the debate whether it is a new or an old phenomenon can take many forms. In this essay, I attempt to add an Estonian perspective to the ongoing debate whether globalization is an old or a new phenomenon. My thesis stems from Stuart Hall’s remark that globalization is the “process of profound unevenness” (Hall, 1997) . And yet he claims that it is impossible to think of history of English society in any other context than globalization (ibid) . Perhaps this is why the scholarly globalization discourse is dominated foremost by Anglo-Saxon perspective, and Estonian perspective to globalization could therefore offer a contrasting point of view.
From this angle of uneven globalization, the current globalized world is sometimes described as being penetrated by unknown and by “new players on a rather flat playing field” (Friedman, 2005) . I am curious to analyze globalization from the angle of these less known actors who now have an influencing power. The key to understand the novelty of present-day globalization, if viewed from the small nation-state point of view, is that globalization offers a voice for previously unknown actors. This is aspect of globalization is new, almost revolutionary.
Among these previously unheard voices are small nation-states like Estonia. While not being typical for all the Baltic countries or even for Eastern Europe, I argue that as a member of most Western international institutions and organisations, including the EU, NATO and the OECD, Estonia serves well to provide a facet of Western, yet non-Anglo-Saxon, point of view regarding global experience.
I will analyse briefly three historic periods and examine how their cultural, economic and political experience corresponds to what Estonia currently experiences as globalization. Do they offer a basis for argument that globalization is nothing new or can these historic examples be dismissed as irrelevant? I will consider whether these periods offered a small country an equally strong voice in the global arena as the present day global situation does.
First period: Hanseatic League
One way to look at globalization is through a trade-centered lens: globalization then refers to the ‘expansion in the scale and speed of flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas across borders with the effect of decreasing the effects of distance’ (Norris, 1999) . Some authors propose that globalization started as early as the 1500s (Harvey, 1995), (Friedman, 2005) . When looking for parallels from the same period around the Baltic Sea, we find the trade activities of Hanseatic (or Hansa) League.
The phenomenon of Hanseatic alliance operating on the Baltic Sea from 13th to 17th century has many parallels with economic globalization, as it was a trade driven phenomenon, in which goods, people and ideas moved from place to place relatively fast and where “Estonian and Latvian cities reaped huge profits from Hanseatic trade” (Mills, 2008) . The roles of over one hundred cities in this loose trade coalition were based – similarly to the present-day globalization – on the concept of division of labour: expanding skilled population in Medieval Flanders, and East Anglia could specialize in manufacturing because they were assured of food supplies from far and separated sources (Palamets, 1998) .
Politically, there is another connection with the present-day globalisation, as the Hanseatic League’s political body Hansa Diet was, quite similarly to the present-day international trade organisations occupied with “negotiations with foreign towns or rulers, ratification of trading agreements or privileges, trade and commercial blockades, financial matters, military issues, membership expansion or exclusion of member towns, conflicts within the members, conflicts with feudal nobility, and competition policy” (Mills, 2008) .
The development of trade relations was accompanied with the – further civilizing – legal aspects. Leonard Liggio claims that Hansa urban legal customs were decisive in economic success: “Introduced with modifications in Lubeck, it [Westphalia urban legal customs] was taken from there along the Baltic shores as far as Estonia” (Liggio, 2011, February) .
Culturally, the local experience of these trade relations was very much influenced by “actions at distance” as Anthony Giddens views globalization (Tomlinson, 2000) . Considering that the ethnic Estonian population did not have status as citizens and therefore was not allowed to trade, there is evidence that fast travelling goods and ideas nevertheless influenced the ethnic population. Employed as labourers and as carters (men) and as servants in households (women) during those three-four centuries, the lingua franca of the Hanseatic League - the Low German language - left a noteworthy trace in Estonian language. It is estimated that one quarter of the Estonian language vocabulary has Middle Low German origin (Hvostov, 2005) .
Hanseatic League cannot be compared with the extent of today’s globalisation, as the trade on the Baltic and Northern Seas was not intercontinental. Yet its regional nature should not be considered as an exclusion from larger global economic cooperation. Globalization can take place between the regions. As the Western part of Hanseatic League reached as far as London, trade on the Baltic and North Sea could therefore be seen as an eastward extension of the England-centered global trade relations.
One can conclude that although the vocabulary is evidence that ethnic Estonians were impacted significantly by foreign cultures through trade and communication during these four medieval centuries, the ethnic Estonian residents were not yet agents in mutual interconnectedness due to class-based exclusion from trade. Therefore, this exclusion separates this old phenomenon from present day globalization’s Estonian experience. Extensive trade during Hansa period cannot therefore used as an argument for globalization being old, if viewed from the ethnic Estonian perspective.
Second period: 1850 - 1914
In the debate whether the globalization is an old or a new phenomenon, Hirst and Thompson claim that globalization as we know it now is nothing new, as the flows of trade, capital investments and labour migration during the period of 1850-1914 were greater than those of today (Hirst & Thompson, 2002) . I assume that they refer to the British Empire’s trade relations with its colonies.
Considering that the Hansa trade was redirected from the Baltic Sea after the Livonian war, the degree of the capital investments and labour migration fell significantly. Therefore the degrees of trade and labour movements experienced by the people of Governorate of Estland within Russian Empire cannot be significant during this period. Furthermore, the Crimean War, which took place between 1853 and 1856, had stopped the trade relations between the warring sides the British and Russian Empires. Trade negotiations between Russia and England did not start again until 1921. Therefore, from an Estonian perspective, Hirst and Thompson’s argument regarding that globalization is old, does not apply.
Culturally, it might be tempting to examine Tomlinson’s claim that globalization, “far from destroying it, has been a significant force in creating and proliferating cultural identity” (Tomlinson, 2000) . The basis of the Estonian nation-state in terms of self-awareness was created during this period. Does this mean that once there is a rise in nationalism, therefore there must be globalization, too? The rise of the nationalism movement in Governorate of Estland around late 1860ies was a protest against the local German nobelty and later, against active Russification processes (Hvostov, 2005) . Although the nationalist movement was opposing itself against the foreign rulers, one cannot talk about globalization processes per se during that period, as regional forces, not global ones, ruled Estonia.
Third period: post WWII
Although the post-WWII period in globalization is understood as one continuous period from a Western perspective, from an Estonian perspective this is divided into two distinct diametrically opposed periods: Soviet occupation and re-independence.
Soviet globalization?
As a result of Soviet occupation in 1940, Estonia was excluded politically, legally and economically from globalizing West until 1991. But was the exclusion also cultural? And secondly, I am curious whether this exclusion behind the Iron Curtain also meant the end of the globalization experience?
From a political point of view, Soviet annexation clearly eliminated Estonia’s sovereignty and therefore its ability to be a political player in the further globalizing world order.
Viewed from an economic angle, globalization is often associated with the trade and capital flows and migration of people (Collier, 2007) . However, there was no lack of movement of trade, people and capital in Soviet Estonia. Moore and Lewis have concluded that the ideas and practices of globalization existed in the Communist world, as well (Moore & Lewis, 2010) . They state that Stalin’s vision of globalization was embodied in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON. By the time Soviet Union had signed trade agreements with China in 1950, its economic cooperation can be considered truly globalized in its intercontinental sense. In addition to cooperating with Cuba and Vietnam, COMECON also accepted the cooperation and/or observer participation of socialist states from four continents. Ironically, China’s further retreat into the excesses of Maoism and its aftermath would push the Soviet leadership further towards globalization (ibid.).
This type of Soviet globalization during 1940-1991 was experienced by the influx of hundreds of thousands of Russophones to Estonia from other Soviet Republics over which Estonia did not have control. This radically altered Estonia's demographic balance as a result (Feldman, 2005) . By 1989, Estonians composed only 61,5 percent of the total population compared with 88,2 in 1934 (Raun, 2001) . These flows of migration were accompanied with the comparable rates of trade and investment flows under the heavy industrialization programs.
Estimating Estonia’s ability to trade globally, we find that in the second half of the 1980s, only 2 to 3 percent of Estonia’s exports went outside of the Soviet Union, about two thirds of these trade flows were exported to other COMECON countries according to Kalev Kukk, Estonian economist (Feldmann, 2006) . Based on these low levels of export and its inability to control migration flows, I argue that in addition of Estonia not being a political actor, Estonia did not have an economic power either to influence global markets. Therefore the COMECON type of globalization cannot be used as an argument in the old vs. new debate: despite its significant trade and migration flows, Estonia’s ability to participate fully was restricted.
While economic relations with the West were minimal, Western culture was nevertheless influencing Estonia. Finnish communication theorist Terhi Rantanen claims that globalization does take place in closed societies, too (Rantanen, 2001) . She relies on Tomlinson’s 1999 definition of globalization as “complex connectivity” referring to interdependencies in modern life, and states that because globalization is associated with the latest communications technology, countries considered as ‘the Other’ by Western scholars are often neglected in research. She emphasizes that what plays a role in globalization is not necessarily the novelty of technologies, but how they are socially used. In the Soviet Union, small and imported technology was used to spread messages that were suppressed or ignored by big government owned and –controlled media. Soviet audience found their way to non-Communist programmes through individual use of videocassettes (Rantanen, 2001) .
This “outward Westernization” of Soviet Estonia was also experienced via Finnish tourists, Finnish TV and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty and Voice of America. The documentary ‘Disco and Atomic War’ (Kilmi & Aarma, 2009) claims that due to Finnish TV coverage in Estonia, “the Soviet regime went head-to-head with Western pop culture and learned that no one really cared about Lenin or Marx. Instead, the Estonian public wanted to know who shot J.R. and what the latest disco moves are” (IMDB, 2009) .
Although Rantanen claims that “ordinary citizens could connect themselves to the outside world”, I point out that information flowed mostly in one direction from West to East. This direction was applied in Soviet Union as well, as Estonia continued to spread Western cultural influences further east. This gave Estonia peculiar cultural influence in the Soviet Union as it was considered “the West within the Soviet Union”. Culturally speaking, this experience of being a cultural globalization agent is quite similar to the present-day experience of globalization, where Estonia as an independent state can introduce its culture to the world.
Nevertheless, I argue that the Estonian experience of Soviet globalization is different due to political reasons. Being cut off from West politically, on one hand, and having no means to participate in Western information flows cannot be used as examples of globalization being an old (Soviet era) phenomenon.
Regaining independence
With the restoration of Estonian independence in 1991, from a political perspective the most important development this brought was that it gave Estonia a voice in the international arena. This elevated Estonia from an object of globalization to a subject; it was no longer a passive entity influenced by globalization, but an agent of globalization.
Re-establishing independence in the middle of the intensive phase of post-WWII globalization meant that Estonia entered the arena well into the period, when “liberal democratic state’s functional responsibilities are expanded and at the same time its capacity to deal with the new demands is weakened” (Held & McGrew, 1993) . According to this take on globalization, the timing of Estonia’s re-emerging as a player in international arena could not be worse. In response to this challenge, which some theorists see as a “crisis for the territorial nation-state” (Held & McGrew, 1993) , Estonia extended its global cooperation. Estonia joined almost all Western organizations and the extent of this international integration is one of the newest elements in Estonian global experience. Estonia made this decision in order to broaden its political capacity to deal with the new global demands.
Ironically, Estonia’s most ambitious international membership was EU accession, the success in which made the “crisis of the nation-state” even worse. Although not a global institution, the “EU is most restrictive towards national autonomy amongst the contemporary international organizations” (Albi, 2002) : EU accession meant adopting the entire acquis communautaire, which accounts for approximately two thirds of Estonia’s legislation. Estonia also changed its constitution[1] as it was considered as one of the most sovereign ones in Europe and therefore in conflict with EU (ibid.).
This process of seeking membership in international organizations by Estonia demonstrates one of the most contradictory elements in present day globalization. By pursuing security through connectivity with other states, Estonia surrendered at each step its hard-earned sovereignty, which it had regained only shortly before.
Another new aspect in the Estonian global experience is the extreme openness of its economy. Chang’s ladder – protectionist measures for promoting infant industry growth was never used (Chang, 2003) . Estonia adopted a liberal economy, a flat tax system and small or no budget deficit even before joining the EU. Estonia’s market is often considered to be one of the most open in the world. This has consequently opened Estonian economy to severe global crises, which have brought along very short boom and bust cycle and severe economic meltdowns.
Two main global channels exacerbated Estonia’s economy slowdown in 2008 further: capital flow channel, the tightening of credit conditions by Nordic lenders; and trade channel, the disappearance of export markets. These channels made the small open economy particularly vulnerable (Brixiova, Vartia, & Wörgötter, 2010) . Strictly speaking, large part of the recession was not global, but European. Majority of Estonia’s export, for example, goes to the EU countries – only 30 percent of product is exported to other countries than EU. Therefore, the EU accession did not only advance Estonia’s economy but also destabilize it (Kukk, 2010) .
This vulnerability is another contradictory aspect of contemporary globalization. Although Held and McGrew claimed that government’s capacity to deal with the new demands is weakened in those situations (Held & McGrew, 1993) , Estonian government nevertheless introduced austerity measures to control the situation. These measures resulted in lower salaries (approximately by nine percent) while personal debt of many people had increased. Therefore the most recent globalization experience was painful. On the other hand, no large scale protests a ‘la Greece took place in Estonia.
Why have Estonians tolerated globalization “have-not” times so stoically, without anti-globalization riots, one could wonder. I speculate that the unpleasant properties of globalization were partially compensated by politicians with the yields of global opportunities or the ‘have’-s. Estonian elite has distinguished the country globally as information communication technology and gene technology pioneer, increasingly also as a cyber defence specialist, a leader in e-government and e-elections unlike any other former Soviet countries. Political rhetoric takes full advantage of Estonia being a Skype creator country (as three creators of Skype were Estonians). The fact that a small nation-state is able to create globally significant and revolutionary technology is often used in Estonian political rhetoric. Its national pride is further reassured by headlines like ‘Estonian exceptionalism’ in The Economist (The Economist, 2011), which claims that exceptionally harsh austerity measures had worked as the economic situation is finally normalizing.
Regardless of how these globalization gains have been used politically, this aspect of having an unprecedented global face in chosen sectors is nevertheless an argument that Estonian experience of present day globalization is new.
From cultural viewpoint, considering there is only one million ethnic Estonians in Estonia, globalization offers unprecedented challenges, as well. The fear is that the national identity can be lost in the context of open markets and borders, and free movement of people. Despite the factual multiethnic country – 142 different ethnicities live in Estonia (Statistics Estonia, 2011) the state is built up as mono-cultural nation-state, which constitution demands to ‘guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation, language and culture through the ages’ (Estonian Constitution, 1992) . The new challenge is, how to preserve Estonian culture in the EU and globally, considering Estonians form two thirds of the total population and only 0,19 percent of European population?
Due to the fears regarding a foreign influx, Estonia has been reluctant to accept refugees and immigrants and is therefore often considered to be openly nationalistic and even xenophobic. New however is the realization that Estonian language, cornerstone for national identity, has a legal status in the EU and is therefore protected. Even newer is the surprising discovery by Pippa Norris who had examined the formation of cosmopolitan identities and found that Estonia is “one of the most globalized countries in world” and that it is possible to be cosmopolitan while preserving national identity (Norris, Korraga saab olla nii eestlane kui kosmopoliit, 2011) .
Conclusion
I have compared three historic periods with the present-day globalization in order to analyze whether globalization, as experienced by Estonia, is a new or an old phenomenon. The most recent experience of Estonia is the re-establishment of its independence and subsequent partial loss of sovereignty in the EU, with all its economic, political and cultural aspects. I have therefore evaluated the historic globalization processes from this angle: has Estonia been a player in international arena to the similar degree as it is today, or not.
When defining globalization purely through an economic angle, there have been similar periods in history before: Hansa League and the Soviet globalization. However, because ethnic Estonians were excluded from being an agent in those processes, these historic periods cannot be considered as globalization as they experience it today.
Culturally, Estonia’s culture in both cases was influenced by far-away actions similar to the globalization phenomenon. Nowadays, however Estonia enjoys the ability to introduce its culture actively to the outside world, and this aspect is new, too, in its globalization experience.
The phase between 1850 -1914, which have been used as an argument for globalization being an old phenomenon due to England’s extensive trade relations, is not valid from Estonia’s viewpoint, as due to its unevenness, globalization experience is subject to local geopolitical situation.
Consequently, the essay’s goal was to illustrate how differently could globalization be experienced locally. For example, the major difference is that the Estonian experience of the third, post-WWII phase of globalization is two-fold, composing of two very different sub-phases: Soviet, and independent era. During the last 60-70 years, Estonia’s global experience has been much more intense compared to the mainstream Western one. The novelty of present day globalization lies in its unprecedented controversy surrounding sovereignty and identity issues in addition to having an ability to influence global affairs.
I claim the local experiences of global matters influence how the globalization theory is understood locally. Therefore, all consequent debates about globalization (whether it is good or bad, for example) can differ locally, as a result.
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